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Abstract
The principal findings of this study are that Great Britain's search for an
independent nuclear deterrent was waged with a purposeful dedication that
wedded highly effective statecraft and brilliant, innovative nuclear engineering
to produce a strategic nuclear deterrent that remained under her sovereign
control. Because Britain's efforts in this area were so often achieved in the face

of United States' opposition, Britain's subsequent utilization of her deterrent
capability as an instrument to secure American support, notwithstanding that
opposition, ought to be considered an example of successful policy manage

ment. The product of this effort has been the Anglo-American "special relation
ship" in nuclear weapons. The demonstrable success of British policy
management to nurture and secure the special relationship in nuclear weapons
is confirmed by its endurance in the face of American indifference, if not overt

hostility, to its continuation. A major contention of this inquiry, therefore, is
that the independent nature of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent has bee n the
primary prerequisite for the evolution of an interdependent, hence "special,"

relationship with the United States. This relationship will endure, for it must;
the physics and metaphysics of strategic relationships in the thermonuclear age
will secure this constancy. In the meantime, Britain will play a far greater role
internationally than heretofore, just as the special relationship binds her ever
closer to the United States. And this, after all, has always been a principal
objective of British policy.

Preface
The Cold War is over. In its wake, a new world order has emerged. The

specter of Soviet communism threatening the West has vanished with the
collapse of Soviet power. Seeking an explanation for that collapse, the distin

guished strategic thinker, Sir Michael Howard, observed:

All the conventional wisdom patiently garnered and winnowed over the past forty
years, all those hundreds of books and scores of thousands of articles about
East-West confrontation churned out by international-relations and strategic
studies communities, suddenly seem about as relevant to our present concerns as
the lore of medieval alchemists. Where now shall wisdom be foundi

Where indeed? With the smashing of the Cold War paradigm, an even more
decisive question emerges: How was atomic, and later thermonuclear, policy

qua policy managed during the Cold War?

Credit for the defeat of the Soviet Union has been justifiably attributed to the

United States policy of strategic encirclement by means of naval, air, and
land-based nuclear weapons. However, what is not so clear or so public is the
collateral role played by Great Britain in the containment-hence deterrence

and fmal denouement of the Soviet Union. As a thermonuclear power in her

own right, Britain can project her power globally and impact thereby the central

geostrategic balance of power.
Britain's nuclear capability has been overshadowed by the numerical
predominance of the American and Soviet arsenals and, in particular, by the
configurational diversity of American weapon systems. Consequently, with a
few notable exceptions, Britain's nuclear capability has been marginalized by
2
scholars and other commentators. Thus, "the search for the origins of Soviet

American antagonism has tended to push the role of the third of the Big Three
3
to the margins." This focus, however, has been misdirected, for Great Britain

has been remarkably successful in achieving her political objectives vis-i-vis
the Soviet Union-and the United States. The source of this success lies in
Britain's development of a credible independent nuclear deterrent and the
concomitant policy to manage it. Britain has skillfully placed her nuclear
strategy at the service of national policy and has realized very great results for
her efforts. In so doing, Britain has proven herself an apt student of Bismarck.
With the smashing of the prevailing Cold War paradigm, therefore, the time
has come to rethink Britain's postwar role and perhaps discard old images and
prejudices, since "there is a general acceptance within the literature published
since the opening of the archives that British foreign and defense policy was

much more important during the formative Cold War years than had tradition

ally been recognized ... We need. therefore, to inquire into the British approach
.

to nuclear deterrence to discover its source and substance. In this connection,
we need to treat the modalities adopted by British policymakers for the
management of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent and, ultimately, iden
tify those politico-strategic objectives Britain sought and seeks to gain by virtue
of her possesis on of such aw esome weapons. In her pursuit of those objectives,

Britain's deterrence doctrine developed around the following core themes:
•

A commitment to First Principles. These are the transhistorical prin
ciples bequeathed to Britain by the geopolitical-geostrategic reality of her
island-nation location as well as those of her greatest statesmen-principles
which Britain has shown fidelity over the centuries.
•

to

Independent Standing in Nuclear Weapons. The development and

deployment of nuclear weapons under the sovereign control of the United

Kingdom. That is to say, Britain has been single-minded in her devotion to the
possesis on of a nuclear deterrent that

is under the

operational guidance of a

single, sovereign key-a British key.
•

The Questionable Reliability of the United States. The British have

questioned the reliability of the United States

defense of vital British interests-or,

to apply its nuclear weapons in
alternatively, to risk destruction of

American cities in a nuclear crisis, notwithstanding the NATO alliance. The

American nuclear '"umbrella."the British might argue, offers Europe protection
in fair weather only and will not open for them when and if the "storm" comes.
•

Maintenance of an Assured Destroction Capability. The British have

developed the nuclear capability to inflict unacceptable damage on any adver

sary. This capacity seems to underpin all the above assumptions.
•

New Directions for DeteJTence: Development of • Substrateaic Role

for Strategic Systems. As Great Britain enters a new world order, she

is

adapting her most advanced strategic deterrent-the Trident n ballistic missile
nuclear submarine (SSBN)-to meet the challenge of substrategic threats posed

by such rogue powers as Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, among

others.

The evolution of Britain's nuclear deterrence doctrine is, therefore, the initial

focus of this paper. In section

n.

attention is given

to examining

how Britain

forged the instruments of deterrence. This inquiry treats the use of secrecy as

strategy and, following what I have tenned the Thucydidean paradigm,

Britain's pursuit of dissimulation as statecraft. As section n examines policy

to exploit

her possesis on of

nuclear weapons for explicit political-strategic advantage

also explored.

management, Britain's seizure of the opportunity

viii

is

Here, Britain's utilization of the power inherent in an independent nuclear
deterrent,

instrumentally, to exert control over United States strategic policy

was an example of successful policy management and statecraft.

Having treated deterrence doctrine, the modalities of policy, and policy

management, attention is then devoted to Britain's deterrence systems and their
generational development, from the V-Bombers to the strategic nuclear sub

marines, Polaris and Trident. Of some importance in this evolution was the

extensive British effort to develop a redesigned warhead for the Polaris missile.

Chevaline was the fruit of that effort, providing an extended life span for
Britain's aging Polaris fleet in the 1980s and early 19905.

This paper concludes with an

assess ment of the future of British nuclear

deterrence in terms of Britain's objectives as she attempts to shape and in turn

be shaped by the new world order upon which the international system is
entering, now that the Cold War is over. Here, the enduring nature of the
Anglo-American special relationship, as it has applied to nuclear weapons, is
examined. A basic premise and theme of this study is that the enduring nature
of this special relationship, in the face of American ambivalence, and even

opposition, is testimony to the triumph of British policy management, statecraft,
and ingenuity in weapons engineering. A proper understanding of this highly

complex and yet public relationship will provide some insight into what I have
tenned the "Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence."

ix
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The Evolution of a Doctrine

First Principles

THE

BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT EVOLVED out of a commitment
first principles, followed by single-minded devotion to policy execu
tion. In this connection, we are reminded that "Great Britain is one of the few
powers of the modem age which has developed viable defense plans against
unspecified antagonists. ...s That is to say, "her insular situation has permitted
planning not against individual foes, but against functional threats: To maritime
supremacy, to the Mediterranean-Middle East, to British home security ..6 In
so doing, Britain faithfully adhered to first principles, which have governed her
foreign policy for several centuries.
It fell to Winston Churchill to articulate those principles, in unusually explicit
fashion. Speaking privately to the Conservative Members Committee on
Foreign Affairs at the end of March 1936, Churchill advised:
to

.

For four hoodred years the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the
strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on the Continent, and par
ticularly to prevent the Low Coootries falling into the hands of such a Power.
Viewed in the light of history, these four centuries of consistent purpose amid so
many changes of names and facts, of circumstances and conditions, must rank
as one of the most remarkable episodes which the records of any race, nation,
state, or people can show. Moreover, on all occasions England took the more
difficult course . . . joined with the less strong Powers, made a combination
among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the Continental military tyrant

The Newport Papers
whoever he was, whatever nation he led . .. Here is the wonderful unconscious

tradition of British foreign policy. All our thoughts rest in that tradition today. I

know of nothing which has occurred to alter or weaken the justice, wisdom, valor,

and prudence upon which our ancestors acted. I know of nothing that has

happened to human nature which in the slightest degree alters the validity of their

conclusions. I know of nothing in military, political, economic, or scientific fact

which makes me feel that we might not, or cannot, march along the same

road.

I venture to put this very general proposition before you because it seems to me
that if it is accepted, everything else becomes much more simple.

Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that

seeks the overlordship of Europe. The question is not whether it

is Spain, or the

French Monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German Empire, or the Hitler

regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely with

whoever is the strongest or the potentially dominating tyrant.... It is a law of

public policy which we are following, and not a mere expedient dictated by

accidental circumstances, or likes and dislikes, or any other sentiment.7

The general principle defining British foreign policy therefore explains why,
with respect to the development of an atomic weapon, .. the original decisions
were unrelated to any specific foreign enemy. The bomb was wanted not to

defeat an opponent but for a series of unspecified future contingencies . ..8 In that
sense, then, Britain became .. the first nation to develop the [nuclear] weapon
as a long-range strategic asset, unrelated to dangers posed by the overt hostility
of a specific opponent. ..9
"Britain had been the midwife of this bomb. H it had not been for the brilliant

scientific work done in Britain in the early part of the war, by refugee scientists
from Europe and by British scientists, the Second World War would almost
certainly have ended before an atomic bomb was dropped. It had been the

cogency and clarity of the British Maud Report in 194 1 which had persuaded
the Americans of the practical possibility of an atomic bomb and the urgency

of making one ...10 Later, after American entry into the war, there was close
collaboration with Britain on the development of an atomic bomb. For her part,
in line with the fll'St principle of foreign policy alluded to above, Great Britain
was determined to produce her own atomic bombs after the war was over.

Clear evidence on this point exists. Sir James Chadwick, Britain's greatest

living nuclear physicist, informed General Leslie Groves, Director of the
Manhattan Project "during the war that Britain would go in for large-scale
atomic production after the war. .. 11 Also, in her official history of the United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), Margaret Gowing provides
2
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rather explicit testimony on the cosmic power which this ftrst principle held for

British decision makers as the war ended. She writes:

The British decision to make an atomic bomb had "emerged" from a body of
general assumptions. It had not been a response to an immediate military threat
but rather something fundamentalist and almost instinctive-a feeling that
Britain must possess so climacteric a weapon in order to deter an atomically
armed enemy, a feeling that Britain as a great power must acquire all major new
weapons, a feeling that atomic weapons were a manifestation of the scientific
and technological superiority on which Britain's strength, so deficient if
measured in sheer number of men, must depend. A bomb would not be ready in
any case for five years, so that the decision was of the variety that was impossible
not to take rather than of the type that must be taken for urgent and immediate
purposes.

12

British nuclear deterrence doctrine, then, had emerged out of a core ftrst
principle: the assumption that in a world of sovereign nation-states competing
for advantage-and notwithstanding prevailing alliances-there were, to
paraphrase Lord Palmerston, no permanent friends and no permanent enemies,
only permanent interests.

lndependent Strnding
Britain's determination to preserve the independent nature of her strategic
deterrent was thus rooted in ftrst principles and was calculated to free her from
dependence on external sources. These factors, rather than any political dif

ferences with the United States over the sharing of nuclear weapons technology,

appear to have been decisive factors in the decision to seek an independent
atomic deterrent for Britain. In any event, the British decision to begin develop

ment of an atomic bomb "had not been taken as a result of the breakdown in
1946 of Anglo-American atomic cooperation. The decision to produce ftssile

material in the United Kingdom had been taken before this breakdown and was
13
regarded as non-negotiable in any circumstances." What drove the policy,
rather, was the fundamental consideration that in a world of sovereign nation
states, Anglo-American interests were not necessarily identical, not necessarily
paraUel, not necessarily convergent. Therefore, with respect to Britain's quest
for an independent nuclear deterrent, "some elements of British policy have
carried the suppressed premise that there might develop a divergence of
strategic interest between America and Britain. In fact, this might be called the

premise behind the whole of the British advanced-weapons programme, from
3
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Attlee's ftrst decision to build atomic bombs... 14 Speaking at a secret and
specially convened Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet on 8 January 1947,
Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Foreign Secretary. Ernest Bevin, "said it was
important that Britain should press on with the study of all aspects of atomic
energy. 'We could not afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this
new development' .. IS
Even at the height of the Cold War. reliance on the nuclear umbrella provided
by the United States was not a popular concept within the Royal Air Force. Sir
John Slessor. Chief of the Air Staff. again took up Bevin's theme in a 1954 DBC
broadcast: "The bomber is the primary agent of air mastery. If we want to
remain a first class power we cannot possibly leave to an ally. however staunch
and loyal. the monopoly of the instrument of such decisive importance in these
massive issues of war and peace." 16 Slessor's views were sanctioned by Arthur
Henderson. a "respected former Secretary of State for Air." During one of the
rare parliamentary debates on creation of the British strategic nuclear deter
rent-the context was the debate over the Air Estimates for 1954-Henderson
warned: "I do not think that we should put all our bombing eggs into the copious
American basket.. 1 7 Henderson's socialist colleague. John Strachey. Opposi
tion Spokesman on Defence. concurred, supporting the Churchill government's
proposed policy as well as the delivery system for atomic bombs. The strategic
bomber. he declared, was the contemporary equivalent of the Dreadnought
battleship and consequently the "essential weapon for this island... 1 8 A core
concern during this period was that in the event of war Britain might have a
different set of targeting priorities than the United States. As Prime Minister
Sir Winston Churchill put it in a 1955 parliamentary debate:
Unless we can make a contribution of our own ... we cannot be sure that in an
emergency the resources of other powers would be planned exactly as we would
wish, or that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we
consider the necessary priority in the ftrst few hours. These targets might be of
such cardinal importance that it would really be a matter of life and death for
us. 19

Consequently. Bomber Command. "like SAC. developed its nuclear bomber
capability separately from NATO force structure planning.,,20 Determined to
play her role in NATO. Britain nevertheless retained for herself at the same time
a nuclear deterrent capability outsitk the alliance and, in particular. independent
of U.S. control. Churchill's focus on the necessity for an independent nuclear
deterrent in such primordial terms proved to be a recurrent theme in British
doctrinal justification. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. for example, advised
4
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the House of Commons in 1963 that Britain "'should be in a position

to make

[its] own decision without fear of nuclear blackmail' and, should the 'necessity

arise. to make its

independent decisions on issues vital to her life. '.....21

That

such concerns were contractually articulated and secured was revealed in the

exchange of letters between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President

Jimmy Carter. consummating the Trident submarine sale on 10 July 1980. Item

number three of Thatcher's letter contained the relevant caveat:

The successor to the Polaris force will be assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization.liJce the Polaris force; and except where the United Kingdom may
decide that supreme national interests are at stab. the succesrso force will be
used for the purpose of international defense of the Western alliance in all
circumstances.22

Mrs. Thatcher's single qualification., then. is not merely an escape clause for

Britain's independent deterrent-it is its very raison d'itre. Nothing else in the
way of deterrence would do.
Nuclear independence thus satisfied Britain's need

to define for herself the

limits of strategic policy. The result of Britain's effort in this direction was the

creation of a "second center of decision" in the Anglo-American strategic
23
calculus. Denis Healey. a Labour Minister of Defence. discussed the political

and strategic implications. situationally: "If you are inside the alliance you
increase the deterrent

to

the other side enormously if there is more than one

centre of decision for the fltSt use of nuclear weapons ...24 It fell
Minister of Defence. a Conservative. Fnncis Pym.

to a successor
to take Healey's doctrinal

principle to its logical geostrategic conclusion. Speaking in a rare parliamentary
debate on strategic deterrence doctrine on 24 January 1980. Pym warned the

Soviets against overt threats to Great Britain. The consequences would be most

unfortunate for the Soviet Union:

The nuclear decision would be no less agonizing for the United Kingdom than
for the United States but it would be a decision of a separate and independent
power and a power whose survival in freedom might be more directly and closely
threatened by aggression in Europe than that of the United States.
That was where the fact of having to face two decision-makers instead of one
was of such significance. Soviet leaders would have to assess that there was a
greater chance of one of them using its nuclear capability than if there were a
single decision-maker across the Atlantic. The risk to the Soviet Union would be
inescapably higher and less calculable.25
s
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In that awful eventuality, Great Britain and the United States would not
necessarily

be

working in tandem, but quite possibly as separate and inde

pendent actors.Hence the game would become ever more complex for Soviet
ruling elites, who would f11ld themselves at the mercy of a power calculus,
horrifying in scope and dynamics. The threat posed by two allies acting in
concert is merely arithmetical in nature; with separate and independent actors,
operating apart, the threat posed relative to who might inflict what on whom,
when, complicates the strategic calculus exponentially. Such is the concrete
tribute paid to the inherent power of a strategic deterrent capable of operating
against the Soviet Union on a basis independent of United States wishes or, if

necessary, outside her control.

Declarations by the then leader of the Labour Party, Michael Foot, to discard

Britain's independent deterrent should Labour return to power, again allowed
policy makers the opportunity to profess their commitment to its continuance,
as the following 198 1 article from the London

Times made clear:

In the defense community there is a devotion to the idea of a British deterrent
that goes deeper than mere reason would allow. It peeps through the lines in the
dry language of White Papers and statements to Parliament and surfaces in
private conversations. For example, when asked how the Ministry of Defence
would respond to a Secretary of State who arrived with the intention of disman
tling the deterrent, one experienced figure replied: "Every gun in the place would
be turned on him. ..26
The level of devotion drew the following wry observation from the journalist,
Peter Hennessy:

I remarked to a veteran of the deterrent business how dedicated they seemed to
their task. He replied: "Oh yes, they are so fanatical about it that, if all else failed,
they would strap the Polaris missile tubes to the royal yacht as a way of keeping
the thing going. ..%7

This remark is highly evocative, if only because it taps primordial impulses.As

Professor Lawrence Freedman observed in this connection, "The most com
pelling strategic rationale for a British nuclear force ...has an appeal that is

more primitive than intellectual, but is no less powerful for that ...28 In just this

manner, Britain has signalled her continued commitment to staying in the
nuclear game as an actor with independent strategic capability, regardless of
the attendant sacrifices.
6
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The Reliability of the United States
Aside from the independent standing that Britain sought, a secondary theme
emerged to function as a prism through which British governments would view
their nuclear relationship with the United States: the reliability of the United
States in applying its atomic weapons in defense of Great Britain. The words
of former Prime Minister Clement Attlee should be seen in this context. Attlee
recalled in his memoirs:
We had to hold up our �tion ru-a-ruthe Americanc;. We couldn't allow ourselves

to be wholly in their han&;, and their �tion wasn't awfully clear always.... At
that time, we had to bear in mind that there was always the possibility of their

once again. The manufacture of a British
bomb was, therefore, at that stage essential to our defense.... At that time,
although we were doing our best to make the Americans tmderstand the realities of
the European situation-the world situation-we couldn't be sure we'd succeed. In
the em, we did. But we oouldn't take risks with British security in the meantime. ... We
had to face the world as it was. We had to look to our defense-and to our indumiaI
withdrawing and becoming isolationist
atom

future. We could not agree that only America should have atomic energy .,,29

Subsequent events in the history of Anglo-American relations would supply the
British with a series of "litmus tests" for American unreliability, notwithstand
ing the constancy of relations within the Atlantic alliance:
• The McMahon Act, 1946
• The Suez Crisis, 1956
• The Skybolt Missile Crisis and Nassau Conference, 1962-1963
The non-delivery ofPoseidon Missiles to Britain, 1967
• The provision of a nuclear "umbrella" for the defense of Western Europe
For Britain, these litmus tests would confmn that where Britain's most vital
interests-as defmed by Britain-were concerned, United States commitments
had a limited liability. That is to say, in the cases considered, the U.S. attitude
would prove to be at the very least, problematical; at most, hostile.
Litmus Test #1: The McMahon Act, 1946

The United States first undercut British aspirations for cooperation in the
development of nuclear weapons when, in June 1946, the Truman administra
tion published the "Baruch Plan." The Baruch Plan called for international
control over atomic energy, just when Great Britain was hoping that the U.S.
would honor her wartime commitments to continue nuclear collaboration with
7

The Newport Papers
Britain in the postwar years. Such hopes were to be dashed in August, when

President Truman signed the McMahon Act, which prohibited the transfering

to any other nation the scientific and technological information necessary to

manufacture an atomic bomb. The penalties for violating this law were

draconian: death or life imprisonment 30
For Britain, there could be no misinterpretation of the meaning of the

McMahon Act. Both the substance of the Act itself and the political implica
tions it raised signalled American intent insofar as postwar Anglo-American

nuclear collaboration was concerned. President Harry Truman's 20 April

1946 letter to Prime Minister Attlee was particularly unambiguous:

As to our entering at this time into an arrangement to assist the United Kingdom
in building an atomic energy plant, I think it would be exceedingly unwise from
the standpoint of the United Kingdom as well as the United States ....

I would not want to have it said that on the morning following the issuance of

our declaration to bring about international control we entered into a new

agreement, the purpose of which was to have the United States furnish the

information as to construction and operation of plants which would enable the

United Kingdom to construct another atomic energy plant.31

Britain felt betrayed by the United States as a result of this legislation. While

it is quite clear that Britain's decision to "go it alone" in the development of

nuclear weapons was taken independent of the McMahon Act, there is no doubt
that its enactment led Britain to the stark conclusion that earlier American
32
promises in this sphere were unreliable. Senator McMahon's contention to
British ministers that he would have supported looser language in the Act, had

he only known about the intimacy of Anglo-American wartime collaboration,
added insult to injury. Professor Gowing noted in this connection that "imme
diately after the war" much infonnation on the wartime nuclear collaboration
33
with Britain was in fact passed to Congress.
Overcoming feelings of political betrayal, the British nuned to developing and

deploying an atomic bomb unilaterally. Some in the British government believed

it was beyond Britain's capability to develop such a weapon without recourse to
the vast American technological and industrial base. Others ridiculed this fear as

unwarranted. To the doubters, Sir James Chadwick posed this challenge:

so helpless ... that we can do nothing without the United States?"
Christopher Hinton, the great engineer in charge of the industrial side of Britain· s

"Are we

8
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postwar project, took the same line. Indeed, he said that the McMahon Act was
a blessing because it would make the British think for themselves.34
Nevertheless , Britain's fear about American constancy remained: under

what circumstances would America's atomic shield be activated for the
defense of Great Britain? The way the British chose

to address this question

during the Cold War has revealed the doctrinal assumption that questions

American reliability to act as Britain's nuclear shield. Thus, while British

officials usually "refrain from hypotheses on the circumstances that might
cause" the United States to withhold nuclear protection, on those occasions

when they do become more explicit

in their comments the

underlying prin
3s
ciples behind an independent British deterrent are elaborated.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, while the United States enjoyed a

nuclear monopoly, British strategic planners speculated on the future vul

nerability of the American mainland to Soviet nuclear attack. Their con
clusion had important implications for Britain's own efforts at securing

nuclear independence. Their assumption was ..that, in future, Britain might
not be able to rely on the U.S. nuclear threat against Soviet urban and

industrial areas, which hitherto had been seen as the chief deterrent to Soviet
36
adventurisms in Western Europe.,, This justified, in doctrinal and opera
tional terms, an independent effort by Britain, as indicated in this evaluation

by British analysts in July 1954: "Retaliation does not provide a global

defense, it can only defend those places that are completely integrated
po litically. When New York is vulnerable to attack. the United States will
37
not use her strategic weapon in defense of London.,,

This scenario was played to its logical and most explicit conclusion in a

March 1955 analysis by British defense officials. For the United Kingdom it
was "strategically unacceptable to rely entirely on the United States to provide

the deterrent. Moreover, with the rapidly increasing yield of nuclear weapons
it would become progressively more difficult for the United States to come to

our aid if we alone were threatened in view of the consequences to her of such
action. ,,38 This scenario was to be subjected to the test of reality not long after,
in the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Litmus Test #2: The Suez Crisis, 1956
The crisis at Suez represented the decisive moment

in

the

postwar period

when the two allies, Great Britain and the United States, allowed their
heretofore discreet adversarial relationship over politics, economics, and
9
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nuclear weapons-sharing to burst forth into the public domain over a question
of colonialism and national self-interest.39 America's humiliation of Britain and
France for their intervention in Egypt. and a studied ambivalence in the face of
explicit British requests for collective security guarantees under the NATO
Treaty was, for Britain, a traumatic economic-politico-strategic experience.
If the McMahon Act constituted the ftrst practical application of a litmus test
for reliability, then. in British eyes, the U.S. had clearly failed to pass muster.
The 1956 Suez Crisis provided a second such tesL Here again the United States
was to fail. The U.S. had been the decisive factor in securing Britain's 1954
agreement to negotiate a withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, a major British
Middle Eastern base containing seventy thousand British troops. The Anglo
Egyptian negotiations leading to the withdrawal agreement were often
acrimonious, conducted amidst a guerrilla warfare campaign waged by Egypt
against British occupation forces within the Suez Canal Zone. The U.S. earned
British reproach for taking a decidedly pro-Egyptian position during the course
of the negotiations. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden vented his frustration at
American behavior in 1954, declaring, "They want to replace us in
Egypt.... they want to run the world. ..40 The die was cast when, in July 1956,
Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, a strategic artery
for British commerce.
The crisis itself erupted in an Anglo-French- Israeli invasion of the Suez
Canal Zone in October- November 1956. The crisis so severely strained Anglo
American relations that they appeared overtly hostile for a time. As the
Anglo-French task force gathered in the Eastern Mediterranean for the planned
invasion of Egypt. Vice-Admiral Sir Robin Dumford-Slater, Naval Task Force
Commander, signalled on 31 October 1956: "[United States] Sixth Fleet are an
embarrassment in my neighborhood. . . . We have already twice intercepted
U.S. aircraft and there is constant danger of an incident...41 On the morrow,
Admiral Durnford-Slater reported to Sir Guy Grantham, Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean, as follows: "Have been continually menaced during past eight
hours by U.S. aircraft approaching low down as close as 4000 yards, and on
two occasions flying over ships. ..42 The Americans indeed appeared to be trying
to impede if not frustrate Anglo-French operations; the American government,
after all, vigorously opposed the covert Anglo-French- Israeli collusion and
subsequent attack on Egypt. Thus, for example, Vice-Admiral Sir Manley
Power, Commander Allied Carrier Force, wrote in his official report: "I
considered it quite possible .. . that they were obstructing us on purpose as their
aircraft flying in the area rendered our air warning virtually useless...4 3
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On the American side, grim determination prevailed. The orders of Admiral
Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, to the United States Sixth Fleet were

"to keep in close touch with the British and French 'to make sure we knew
where they were and what they were doing., ..44 Admiral Burke recalled for the

John Foster Dulles Oral History Project at Princeton University his instructions
to Admiral Charles R. "Cat" Brown, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet: "to 'go to

sea with his bombs up, ready

to fight anything. ' 'Cat' Brown sent back: 'Who's

the enemy?' and I sent back, 'Don't take any guff from anybody.'" When

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles asked Admiral Burke "whether there was

a way the Sixth Fleet could be used to stop the operation," Admiral Burke

replied, "'Mr. Secretary, there is only one way to stop them.We can stop them,
but we will blast hell out of them.' [Dulles then asked,] 'Well, can't you stop

them some other way?' [Admiral Burke's reply was instructive:] I said, 'No, if
we're going to threaten ... then you've got to be ready to shoot....We can
defeat them-the British and the French and the Egyptians and the Israelis-the
whole goddamn works of them we can knock off, if you want.But that's the
only way to do it. ,..45

When Admiral Brown was asked by the British whether he could reposition
his fleet to move away from its position between Port Said and the Anglo
French invasion armada, Admiral Brown replied that "he had taken up his
position on direct orders from his Government...46
The actions of the U.S.Navy in thwarting British-French plans to depose the
Nasser regime by force were not, therefore, inconsiderable.Looking back on
the Suez war, General Sir Charles Keightley, Commander-in-Chief, Anglo
French forces, noted that:

"It was the action of the u.s. which really defeated us in attaining our object'"
The movements of the Sixth Fleet "endangered the whole of our relations with
that country
..47
.

•

.

.

But as it turned out, American inaction at the strategic level was to prove even
more decisive for Britain-in a negative sense-than had been the actions of
the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Perhaps the most decisive point in the crisis was reached on 5 November
1956, when Marshal Nikolai A.Bulganin, premier of the Soviet Union, sent

letters to Britain and France, warning them of the "dangerous consequences"
of their "aggressive war in Egypt." The two allies had already bombed Egyptian
airfields and were poised to invade the Suez Canal region. Ominously, the
Soviet Union warned that London and Paris were already targeted by Soviet
11
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rocket forces, and it concluded: "We are fully determined to crush the aggres
sors... through the use of force. We hope at this critical moment you will show
prudence and draw corresponding conclusions from this . ..48

In

the face of such provocation, Britain determined to invoke her member

ship in the NATO alliance by asking for U.S. support. As Terence Robertson

has revealed, however:

Street, at least, the facade of political steadiness was supported by
the conviction that in the last analysis the United States would throw a protection
umbrella of nuclear authority over its allies. WISely, however, both governments
asked Washington to confirm that this would be the case. A brief message from
the State Department, however, shattered the facade and let disintegration set in.
In Downing

'"The Government of the U.S.," said the message, "will respect its obligations
under the North Atlantic Treaty arrangements. . . ...4!I

The U.S. response was not satisfactory, as Robertson made clear:
Official exchanges at times of crisis are seldom what they seem. Beneath

harmless exteriors there are explosive intents hidden from all but the few
statesmen who may be aware of the background of events and the contexts in
which they are drafted.30

In

fact, .. the message was deliberately designed to be interpreted in two

ways: The U.S. guaranteed the security of Britain and France if they were
attacked wherever Western interests were at stake; or the United States
Sl
guarantee under NATO was valid only if there was an attack in Europe."
Seeking clarification of this ambivalence, Prime Minister Eden telephoned

President Dwight Eisenhower but was not able to get through. Therefore, he

"sent a personal message to the White House asking for immediate assurance
that the United States would retaliate against the Soviet Union if Britain and
France were attacked. While the long night of grand drama dragged on, the
Prime Minister kept vigil at Downing Street, waiting for the reply that never
S2
came."
At dawn, Anglo-French forces invaded Egypt. This was followed by a run

on the pound sterling, instigated by the United States government itself, to force
the invaders to cease fire and withdraw. They were forced to do so, and in

humiliation. So wide and deep were the fissures in Anglo-American relations

that even a generation later deep scars remained, as David Nunnerley has
observed in his

President Kennedy and Britain:
12
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TIle consequent vibrations on America's alliances are even today [i.e., 1972]
being felt and the full price of Dulles is still to be completely paid. Suez
highlighted the great dangers of Britain's dependence upon American power.
For, despite Macmillan's efforts to continue as if nothing had ever happened, the
Anglo-American relationship has never been quite the same since Suez. . . .53
It is often said that history is written by the victors. In the case of Suez 1956,

the fact is that in American academic and political conventional wisdom the

Suez Crisis is but a mere historical footnote: Britain was defeated and could
henceforth no longer play an independent role on the world scene as a great

power actor.54 From the British perspective, however, Suez remains the

decisive challenge of the postwar period, notwithstanding the deep divisions

within British society over Eden's actions at the time, and notwithstanding the
concurrence of much informed British opinion in the American view.

The actual postmortem on Suez by British leaders, however, led to radically

different conclusions. The key lesson British leaders took away from Suez was

not-as is commonly held-that henceforth Britain could no longer act contrary
to American wishes in the world arena. Rather, in the Suez aftermath Britain
concluded that the U.S. had once again proven herself an unreliable ally when

it came to the protection of those interests Britain considered to be of the fIrst

magnitude. From the bitterness of their Suez experience, British leaders drew
the lesson that henceforth challenges to the United States could never again be

direct. That said, however, British leaders refused to surrender their sovereign

right to take independent action in the future, should British interests be

threatened again. In principle, after Suez the British determined that should their
most vital interests again come under threat, they would act politically,

diplomatically, and strategically to preclude being undercut or otherwise
humiliated by the United States. The test would not come for a generation, but

when it did, Britain's success in the Falklands War of 1982 fully vindicated the
appreciation made by her leaders in the aftermath of the Suez debacle. In the

Falklands, Britain secured full U.S. support for her position despite strong

pressures within the Reagan administration for a more neutral policy, or an even
more radical one which affIrmed the Monroe Doctrine and support for

Argentina's seizure of Britain 's Falkland Islands.55 Britain would have neither.

At the outset, she made clear to the U.S. that in this crisis she expected no less
than complete support from her American ally.

Britain's determination to preserve her control over access to the Strait of

Magellan was demonstrated by the conduct of her naval action during the crisis.

The insertion of a British nuclear attack submarine (SSN), HMS Conqueror, into
the vicinity of the Strait of Magellan and the subsequent sinking of the
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Argentinean cruiser,

General Belgrano, by HMS Conqueror were clear signals

of that detennination.
More ominously, Britain's alleged deployment of a Polaris ballistic missile
carrying submarine (SSBN) to the South Atlantic, as far as Ascension Island,
likewise revealed the length to which Britain was prepared to go to prevail over
any obstacles to total victory, and her own political vindication.56
The situation was readily appreciated by Argentina's foreign minister,
Nicanor de Costa Mendez. In an address (evocative of the Thucydidean Melian
Dialogue,) to a specially convened meeting of the OAS foreign ministers, Costa
Mendez accused the u.S. of "turning its back on the region in order to assist a
European state, also Anglo-Saxon, also an atomic power, also a world power,
in the prosecution of its criminal, aggressive colonialist adventure .

..

�7 Like the

Melians of antiquity, Costa Mendez could only point to the injustice of the
disparities of power between states and the concomitant lack of freedom of
action accorded to pawns. Nevertheless, Costa Mendez accurately identified
the source of Britain's success in the Falklands war and beyond: the possession
of an independent thermonuclear capability, a currency with demonstrable
deterrent value. That, along with an effective display of statecraft in Europe,
within the British Commonwealth, and at the United Nations,

secured

for

Britain full United States cooperation for the duration of the conflict.
Indeed, the linkage between Suez 1956 and the Falklands War was made
explicit and absolute by Julian Amery, a Conservative Member of Parliament.

As a leading imperialist within the Tory Party, Amery had adamantly opposed

the British agreement in 1954 to withdraw British forces from the Suez Canal
Zone. His parliamentary faction, termed the "Suez Rebels" for their opposition

to Britain's agreement to pull out of the Canal Zone, strongly supported Prime
Minister Eden's Suez policy two year later. But once Britain was forced to
capitulate before American pressure to cease military operations against Egypt
and withdraw her forces, Amery in particular castigated his government.
How different it was, one generation later, as Julian Amery basked in the
warm glow of British victory in the Falklands, and with it, vindication. Amery
shared his feelings in a BBC interview with Michael Charlton:

After Suez there was a great streak of defeatism [which] entered into the hearts
and minds of the British Civil Service establishment, which didn't enter into the
gut feeling of the representatives of the British people in the House of Com
mons
After the terribk psychological shock of our defeat-I wouldn 't use
any other word-at Suer. it was an ekment of redemption.58
.

.

•

.
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The lessons Britain learned at Suez were hard, but learned all the same.

Applied in the Falklands War, they secured American support for Britain in a
crisis where America conceivably might not otherwise have been so forthcom
ing. Out of the bitterness of Suez, the Falklands conflict secured Britain concrete

military, political, and strategic objectives. The Falklands was for Britain an
example of superb policy management: Suez had been redeemed.

Suez taught the British a second lesson. The course of events surrounding

the Suez Crisis legitimized and fully vindicated the whole notion of an inde
pendent nuclear deterrent Britain had already deployed some atomic weapons

at the time of Suez. In the wake of Suez, Britain tested her first hydrogen bomb,
in May 1957. This thermonuclear test confirmed explicitly British intentions in

the nuclear weapons sphere. Any presumption that Britain's ambitions in this

realm had been destroyed at Suez would now be fully discredited: the ther
monuclear fallout from the bomb test remained as the existential evidence of
Britain's continuing commitment to possess nuclear weapons that she herself
controlled.

In the wake of Suez, the new Macmillan government, which assumed power

in January 1957, redirected British defense policy. Conventional forces were
reduced, and renewed emphasis was placed on commando carrier operations,
so necessary for the projection of conventional power overseas . With reference
to the independent deterrent, recent research has concluded that what lay behind
Britain's "new look" strategy carried out by the minister of defence, Duncan

Sandys, was "above all . . . motivated by notions of economy and prestige . ..59

Martin Navias has completed a thorough study of Sandys' policies and con
cluded that "it can be argued that throughout the period under study [i.e.,

1955- 1958], it appears that Sandy 's [sic] primary concern was not strategy as
much as economy.,,

60

Sandys' main objective, in this view, was to reduce

military manpower. Accordingly, "Sandys believed that defense was consum

ing too great a proportion of the nation's wealth and that, as the struggle against
the Soviet Union would be long and drawn out, only a healthy economy would
be able to support a prolonged effort. Therefore solvency would have to be
made the overriding goal.

.

.

. ,,61 This thesis is rather overdrawn, for it ignores

or downplays doctrinal presumptions pertaining to nuclear weapons and the
necessity for an independent nuclear capability.

A deeper reading of the evidence available would tend to conftrm that Sandys
was far more committed to the nurturing of an independent deterrent than he
was to balanced budgets. In the course of a parliamentary debate (April 1957),
Sandys would reveal the strategic vision informing his policy:
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So long as large American forces remain in Europe, and American bombers are
based in Britain, it might be conceivably thought safe . . . to leave to the United
States the sole responsibility for providing the nuclear deterrent. But, when they
have developed the S,OOO mile intercontinental ballistic: rocket, can we really be
sure that every American Administration will go on looking at things in quite the
same way?(Q.

So dedicated, then, was Sandys to the preservation and enhancement of
Britain's deterrent and to the notion as well of U.S. unreliability in the future
that he was willing to scuttle Britain's conventional forces for the sake of

building up this capability. The Vice Chief of the Royal Naval Staff, Sir William
Davis, confirmed this assesm
s ent, noting that the minister of defence "did not
have any strategical concept beyond the factor that in his opinion the atomic
..63

weapon was all important.

If this observation reflected an

accurate

assesm
s ent of Duncan Sandys'

appreciation of the strategic imperative for Britain, then the lessons of Suez
were drawn with great clarity: the deterrent must remain independent, and the
reliability of the U.S. to defend Britain's vital interests outside NATO could no
longer be taken for granted.

The lessons of Suez 1956, therefore, had implications for the u.S. and the
Soviet Union that would shape the strategic calculus for the next generation.
Litmus Test '3: The Skybolt and the Nassau Conference, 1962-1963

The Slcybolt Mi&sik Crisis. In

the wake of the Suez Crisis, American

reliability faced yet a third litmus test: the cancellation of an agreement to supply

Britain with Skybolt missiles. Both crises were linked in the sense that Skybolt's
"roots reach to the aftermath of Eden's disappearance from the scene" following

the Suez imbroglio.

64

Skybolt was no minor crisis; "like the Suez debacle of

1956, the crisis over Skybolt brought the Anglo-American alliance to its knees,
producing as it did an almost complete breakdown in transatlantic communica
tion. .

.

. ..65

Since the Skybolt crisis and its subsequent resolution at Nassau capture the
Anglo-American nuclear relationship in all its variegated dimensions, it is
instructive to explore just how this affair raised the issue of American reliability
66
in Britain. The focus of this inquiry, therefore, is on how British statesmen
defined the issues involved and how, in turn, those issues were defmed by their
American counterparts.
The historical background was set at Camp David in March 1960. There
President Eisenhower agreed to supply Prime Minister Macmillan with a new
16
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weapon: Skybolt. Skybolt was not a bomb but a nuclear air-to-ground missile,
a stand-off weapon that could penetrate Soviet airspace in relative safety. The

United States had approved its development only the month before. 67 In return,

the British government made bases on the west coast of Scotland available to

the U.S. Navy for its Polaris missile submarines. Harold Macmillan observed
in his memoirs that the Camp David Agreement established two ironclad
principles: in the first instance, .. the arrangement about Skybolt was not merely

a verbal understanding but a formal and binding agreement...68 Secondly,

Macmillan insisted that he had secured President Eisenhower's "firm, although
not legal," assurance that should Skybolt be proved a failed weapon system,

"we would be able to obtain in substitution the essential elements of Polaris to

be fitted to submarines of our own construction. ..69

In the British view, the crisis over Skybolt arose when the United States

violated the first principle and then refused to accede to the second, not

withstanding British insistence on a moral-legal-political obligation on the part

of the United States to honor both commitments. The crisis, therefore, was

played out on the British side, against the backdrop of these two principles

legality, and the honoring of a commitment made. Hence, the crisis was of a
political and strategic nature, not a mere difference over technical flaws in the
system. Consequently, the political context overshadowed any arguments by
the Americans that Skybolt was not technically feasible or that its development
costs were prohibitive.
The opposition to Skybolt on "technical" grounds was nevertheless extensive
and bitter. Muted warnings over Skybolt's feasibility began to seep out in the
closing days of the Eisenhower administration. These were duly noted by Sir
Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientiftc Advisor to the British Ministry of Defence,
and passed on to Harold Watkinson, the defence minister. Zuckerman recalled
in this connection:

My message was simple. It boiled down to the fact that, while the American
Administration fully recognized that the project had assumed enonnous political
importance in the UK, to President Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Skybolt was no more than a very costly R&D program in which they had little
faith.70

In his fmal defense budget, President Eisenhower assured Britain that he stood

behind the Camp David Agreement, while he reduced the allocation for Skybolt

in his ftnal defense budget before leaving office?1 While still in the U.S. Senate,

John F. Kennedy had sponsored a report on Skybolt ..that had been very

discouraging . ..72 Upon his assumption of office, President Kennedy 's defense
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secretary, Robert McNamara, reconsidered Skybolt and came to view the
project as "proven to be a pile of junk, for which we were paying the whole
bill . . . :.73

Skybolt"s cancellation was therefore inevitable and could have been
legitimately attributable to technical liabilities if the United States had imme

diately offered Britain a substitute system, in particular, Polaris. The fact that
no such offer was made initially leads to the conclusion that Skybolt's cancel

lation was made on other than purely technical or cost grounds-that is, on

political grounds.

The Skybolt dispute actually played against a backdrop of American opposi
tion to national nuclear forces-independent nuclear deterrents. Since the
Frenchforce dejrappe was in its infancy at the time, American opposition was
focused mainly on Britain's deterrent force. The opposition issued from the
very top of the Kennedy administration in the person of the president himself.
President Kennedy's personal example would guide the actions of his advisors
throughout the controversy. To his Special Assistant for National Security
Mfairs, fellow Bostonian McGeorge Bundy, "Kennedy had privately dismissed

Macmillan's cherished deterrent . . . as a 'political necessity but a piece of

military foolishness. . . . , ..74

At a January 1962 White House luncheon given for Julian Amery, who was

Prime Minister Macmillan's son-in-law and now Minister for Air, Kennedy

offered his guest a guarded warning on Skybolt's efficacy. Bri� the president

would advised his guest, should not place much faith in Skybolt becoming an
operational reality. Amery took umbrage at this presidential prediction and

heatedly replied that "Skybolt must be made to work. . . . The political conse

�

quences on An lo-American relations if Skybolt is canceled do not bear
thinking about" S In this assesm
s ent, Amery was in full sync with the thinking

of his father-in-law, the prime minister. Kennedy then sought to reassure
Amery, and the crisis passed -for the moment

Within the Kennedy administration, the focal point for opposition to national

nuclear forces in general and to the Skybolt agreement in particular was

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Over at the State Department, George
Ball, the Undersecretary, was perhaps the most articulate and outspoken op

ponent of the Anglo-American "special relationship" in nuclear weapons, a
relationship restored by President Eisenhower in 1958. Ball was joined in this

outlook by Walt W. Rostow, then head of the prestigious Policy Planning Staff,
and by Robert R. Bowie, a State Department counselor.

Just several months after President Kennedy's warning to Julian Amery, the

Skybolt issue began to move from a dispute over technical feasibility-an area
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where honest differences could exist-to the politico-strategic. Speaking at a
secret NATO Ministerial meeting in Athens, Greece, in early May 1962,
Secretary McNamara attacked the whole notion of national nuclear forces.

Macmillan's reaction to this speech underlined its political motives. Noted

Macmillan, this "speech . . . although nominally 'secret' soon began to
leak. ...76 The leak, however, would not be stanched, for Secretary McNamara

then went public.

In

a now famous address attacking independent nuclear

forces, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on 16 June 1962, McNamara insisted that
"limited nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are dangerous, expen

sive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent. ...77
McNamara's tone was not only self-assured but strident, as he ridiculed the
concept of an independent nuclear deterrent composed of "relatively weak
national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets [as] not likely to
perfonn even the function of deterrence ....78 Macmillan was outraged. He did
not misinterpret McNamara's meaning or nuance, for there was nothing subtle
about it. In delivering this speech, wrote Macmillan, McNamara "could hardly
have done anything more calculated to upset both his French and his British
allies. He put forward with equal vigour and clumsiness a powerful condemna
tion of all national nuclear forces, except, of course, those of the United
States....79
Prime Minister Macmillan rejected McNamara's position and defmed Great
Britain's policy for President de Gaulle:

Britain already had a considerable nuclear force, and we were detennined to
preserve this as "independent" in the sense that ultimate control would be under
a British Government. I felt that this force was important for Britain, just as a
similar force would be for France. It was a symbol of independence and showed
that we were not just satellites or clients of America.80
McNamara's Ann Arbor speech therefore created a crisis of confidence once

again between Britain and the United States. In his diary, Macmillan would
confide:

McNamara 's foolish speech about nuclear arms has enraged the French and put
us in a difficulty . . . . It's rather sad, because the Americans (who are naive and
inexperienced) are up against centuries of diplomatic skill and fmesse.81
If George Ball 's recollection is accurate, then it was only on 8 November

1962 that Secretary McNamara explicitly warned the British Ambassador, Sir
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David Onnsby-Gore, that Skybolt would be cancelled. Ball framed the decision
in the context of American, and not British, strategic interests:

Skybolt had become for

us

not an

essential part of our deterrent
lay the problem. for a point bad been
reached where our requirements and those of Great Britain diverged. The Skybolt
was for us an unneeded supplement to already adequate existing programs; for
Great Britain, it was her only means to koep an independent nuclear capability.12

a marginal,

arsenal. Not so for the British, and herein

National nuclear forces thus posed a serious dilemma for the Americans. In

an address delivered to NATO parliamentarians in Paris on 16 November 1 962,

Ball proposed an American solution: introduction of "a genuine multilateral
medium-range ballistic missile force. fully coordinated with the other relevant
forces of NATO . . . but he was far less enthusiastic about a purely British
deterrent...83 U.s. policy therefore chose "multilatera1ism" as the antidote of
choice against the dangerous notion of national nuclear forces. Skybolt was to

be the instrumentality through which the American government chose to work
to weaken, if not destroy. the institutionalization of national nuclear forces
outside multilateral (i.e .• U.S.) control.

Less than one month later. the tension in Anglo-American relations reached

new heights in the wake of a speech delivered at the United States Military

Academy at West Point by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Speaking

on S December 1962. and with a candor that bordered on the brutal. Acheson

sought to invalidate the singularity of the AnglO-American special relationship
(including the nuclear weapons facet). by

marginalizjng the British contribu

tion:

Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yeA found a role. The attempt to play
a separate power role-that is. a role apart from Europe. a role based on a "special
relationship" with the United States. a role based on being the head of a
"Commonwealth which has no political structure. or unity. or strength and
enjoys a fragile and precocious economic relationship by means of the Sterling
area and preferences in the British market-this role is about played out.14
..

Such an outburst from a highly respected American statesman must be

juxtaposed with his reputation as an Anglophile in culture. manners. and dress .

It should also be seen against the background of the recently concluded Cuban

Missile Crisis in which Acheson had played a role as a roving ambassador.

Acheson visited Macmillan in London in that capacity. Therefore. in making

his remarks. Acheson should be considered a not-so-private citizen; indeed. the
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venue for those remarks would also tend to give them an official tint Examined

in this context. along with McNamara 's Ann Arbor speech, Ball ' s NATO speech

the previous month, and President Kennedy's own position, Dean Acheson's
remarks at West Point provoked dismay, alann, and bitterness in the British
government. especially for the Queen's First Minister.
Macmillan was outraged, particularly at the publicity the speech generated.
He observed in this connection that "no doubt [Acheson's] argument could have
been made discreetly and without offense. "85 The depth of the offense may be
judged from the assesm
s ent of it. made by Macmillan in a letter to his old
colleague of the Second World War, Lord Chandos:
I have only seen the various Press reports of this speech. If those are accurate, in
so far as he appeared to denigrate the resolution and will of Britain and the British
people, Mr. Acheson has fallen into an error which has been made by quite a lot
of people in the course of the last four hundred years, including Philip of Spain,
Louis XIV, Napoleon, the Kaiser and Hitler . .16
.

.

Macmillan's analogies were an indication not only of Britain's defInition of
the situation but also his desperation at the prospect of being denied a proper
nuclear deterrent to fIll the gap between the time the V-Bombers were phased
out of service and the deployment of whatever second-generation deterrent was
eventually chosen. 87 Arraigning Britain's closest ally in the dock alongside her
most treacherous historical adversaries was probably unfair if not absurd.
However, Macmillan, like Churchill before him, was quick to place Great
Britain's interest before sentimentality-and in the instant case, sentiment had
already lost its luster. Always quick to assess a situation, Macmillan now
explicitly defIned the Skybolt affair in political terms, as follows:
In view of the implication of McNamara 's speech in Michigan and again at a
NATO meeting in Paris in December it was difficult to suppress the suspicion

that the failure of Skybolt might be welcomed in some American quarters as a
means of forcing Britain out of the nuclear club.88

The Nassau Conference. The Skybolt missile crisis was ultimately resolved
at a summit conference held at Nassau in Bermuda from 1 8 to 2 1 December
1962. There President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan met and reached
a settlement As he prepared to depart for Nassau, Macmillan conveyed in a
diary entry the sense of grave crisis that was impending: "There will be a great
row in both countries. And it means a great battle with President Kennedy next
week."89 And to his ambassador in Washington, Macmillan sent instructions
21
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on how the Nassau Conference was to be handled. Despite the fact that the

conference had been planned many months earlier and an agenda prepared in
advance, Macmillan now sought to focus exclusively on Skybolt. The gravity
of his concern was conveyed in his instructions to Ambassador Onnsby-Gore:

My difficulty is that if we cannot reach an agreement on a realistic means of
maintaining the British independent deterrent, all the other questions may only
justify perfunctory discussion, since an agonizing reappraisal" of all our foreign
and defense policy will be required. . . .\10
"

Just before his departure, Macmillan traveled to France, at Ramboui1let,

where he held talks with President de Gaulle. Macmillan sought to impress upon
de Gaulle Great Britain's determination to maintain her independent deterrent,
warning:

I would explain to the President that, if Skybolt broke down. I must have an
adequate replacement from the United States, such as Polaris-otherwise Britain
would have to develop her own system, whether submarine or aerial, in spite of
the COSt.91
Perhaps Macmillan wished his warning to be transmitted to the Kennedy

administration via a "back channel" prior to the conference. Nevertheless, when
the British delegation arrived at Nassau on 1 9 December 1 962, they were "in a
not very friendly mood; in fact . . . they were 'the angriest' British delegation
seen at any Anglo-American summit since the war ...92 George Ball recalled the
ambience: the band welcoming President Kennedy to the Bahamas greeted him

with a rendition of "Oh, Don't Deceive me ! ..93 A lack of trust was defmitely
palpable.
Macmillan set the tone for the conference at the initial meeting of both
delegations. There he recalled Britain's historic role in the development of the
atomic bomb. That role, Macmillan reminded his listeners, was no secret:
"

European countries knew perfectly well that Britain had been first in the field

and might be said, up to the end of the War, to have had an equal share in the

equity with America...94 The prime minister then issued an explicit warning that
the continued integrity of Anglo-American relations stood or fell on the issue
of a British independent nuclear deterrent:

If the difficulties arising from the development of Skybolt were used. or seemed

to be used. as a method of forcing Britain out of an independent nuclear capacity,
the results would be very serious indeed. It would be deeply resented both by
those of our people who favored an independent nuclear capability and by those
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who opposed it. It would offend the sense of national pride and would be resisted
by every means in our power."

Startled by Macmillan 's tone, President Kennedy nevertheless "referred to
the difficulty for America in letting us [i.e., the U.K.] change to Polaris . . . that
the change from Skybolt to Polaris was one of principle to which they were

not even honorab ly committed. "96 Instead, Kennedy proposed that

Britain share SO percent of any further development costs of Skybolt. Macmil

lan now saw his opening and turned Kennedy's proposal into a test of American

credibility and reliability:
I observed that although the proposed British marriage with Skybolt was not
exactly a shotgun wedding , the virginity of the lady must now be regarded as
doubtful. We are being asked to spend hundreds of millions of dollars upon a
weapon on which the President's own authorities are casting doubts, both
publicly and privately.97

Macmillan then hoisted Kennedy 's strategy on its very own petard, the

discrediting of Skybolt. Macmillan used previous American arguments against
further development of Skybolt to press for Polaris as the only suitable replace

ment to meet Britain 's strategic requirements over the next generation. Wrote
Macmillan:
As the argument proceeded, the Americans found themselves in the difficulty
that they were resting upon two conflicting arguments. On the one side they said
Skybolt would fail; on the other, they said that it could be made to work but they
did not need it because of the development of Polaris. They were prepared to sell
it to us-on tenns. III

Now that Kennedy had rendered Skybolt operationally dead, Macmillan

would demand Polaris. If no agreement could be reached on Polaris, then the

whole future of Anglo-American relations would be in question; "We have gone
a long way in this nuclear business . . . but if we cannot agree, let us not patch
up a compromise. Let us agree to

part

as friends."99 But Macmillan left the

President in no doubt about the future of the alliance should a Polaris agreement
remain unfulfilled:

"It is possible . . . that my Government will fall on this issue.
. If the United
States fails to help Britain . . . public opinion, fickle as it is, will inevitably
become anti-American." This would lead, [Macmillan] argued, to the assumption
of power of a more neutralist group from within either of the two major political
.
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parties. Indeed Macmillan hinted that it was not inconceivable that his own party
lOG
might acc:ept an anti-American platform in order to retain power.
President Kennedy was now thoroughly alarmed by the

possibility

of a

political-diplomatic-strategic split with Britain. He moved to defuse the crisis

with what appeared to be a compromise solution but which was actually a defeat
for his strategy to eviscerate the special relationship in nuclear weapons with

the United Kingdom. The compromise included the American demand that

British forces be included in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. The single

caveat of this was included in Paragraph 9 of the Statement on Nuclear Defence
Systems, 2 1 December 1962: '"The Prime Minister

made it clear that except

where Her Majesty"s Government may decide that supreme national interests

are at stake," British strategic nuclear forces would be available for the defense
of the Western Alliance.

101

For Harold Macmillan, the Nassau Conference was a great triumph of British

statesmanship and policy management. Macmillan outlined in his diary what

he had achieved at Nassau :

Broadly, I have a� to make our present bomber force (or part of it) and our
Polaris force (when it comes) a NATO force for general purposes. But I have
reserved absolutely the right of H.M.G. to use it independently "for supreme
national interest."

These phrases will be argued and counter-argued. But they represent a genuine
make 8 proper contribution to
interdependent defense, while letaining the ultimate rights of a soveleign state.
02
This accepts the facts of life as they ate. 1

attempt (which Americans fmally accepted) to

Macmillan"s efforts earned for him his Queen's grateful thanks. '"The Queen

congratulated him for having demonstrated that Britain still counted for a great
deal, and could hold her head high. Her Majesty was right...

103

Macmill an had

secured for Britain extremely generous terms for the Polaris agreement. Her

purchase of Polaris missiles from the United States would cost less

than 2

percent of her defense budget. 104 Macmillan refused Secretary McNamara "s

demand that Britain contribute to the research and development costs of Polaris,
agreeing only to "add five per cent to the retail cost" of the end-item.

105

For his

stand on the matter, McNamara earned Macmillan"s censure as "very grasp

ing... 106 Indeed, Dennis Healey, a future minister of defence in a Labour
government headed by Harold Wilson, supported Britain"s continuing role as
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an independent nuclear power in part in reaction to an American detennination
that it should be ended once and for all :

rm bound to say that one factor which strengthened my support for keeping the
things going was that McNamara, and some Americans, were so anxious we

should get rid of il107

The Nassau Conference ended on 2 1 December 1 962. The next day, as it

happen� Skybolt was successfully test-fired on the sixth attempt The an
nouncement was made by Secretary McNamara, but it came only after British

Defence Minister Peter Thomeycroft had returned to London from Nassau to

announce Skybolt's failure as a weapon system. While Macmillan might have

been expected to suffer only embarrassment from this indiscretion, Kennedy

was beside himself with fury.

For President Kennedy, the true lesson of Skybolt might have become
apparent only then. For it was only then that Kennedy realized that the price for
delivering Skybolt to Britain might actually have been cheaper for the United

States in the long run than the settlement reached in Nassau. President Kennedy

would observe to Theodore Sorenson, his White House Counsel, that "it might
well be concluded that . . . we had an obligation to provide an alternative" to

Skybolt 108 It is perhaps of some significance that the President did not suggest

Polaris as that alternative. The lesson the American government would learn
from the Skybolt crisis was that by taking the stand it had, the United States

was forced to settle for a policy outcome it did not desire and which all its efforts
had been directed at defeating. But for the United States it was too late to go
back: America would have to live with the consequences of Nassau. Great
Britain now had her second-generation nuclear deterrent and enjoyed a con
tinuing special relationship with the United States in affumation of that fact.
Britain's "separate power role," contrary to Acheson's characterization, was
still very much alive and would remain so in the future.

For Great Britain, there remained a residue of ill will, notwithstanding her

policy triumph. In the opinion of Britain's prime minister, in the aftermath of

the crisis American reliability remained problematic. The Americans, he noted,
"have handled things in such a way as to make many of us feel very suspi
cious."I09 1n any event, the effects of the Skybolt Crisis "lesson" were to be
lasting.

Slcybolt Redux: The Poseidon

Affair. The United States decision in the

19608 to advance her submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force into
2S
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the next generation once again posed a dilemma for Britain. This next genera
tion, Poseidon, was a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV).

The product of advanced technology, Poseidon was designed to be a counter
force weapon, one that could neutralize Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
defenses by virtue of the independent targetability of each of its multiple
warheads.

In the wake of the U.S. announcement to deploy Poseidon, the dilemma

facing British decision makers was this: should they opt for the new Poseidon
and thus keep pace in qualitative terms, at least, with the U.S., or see the latter
move ahead to a more advanced seaborne missile system just as Britain"s own

first Polaris submarine, HMS �solution, was entering service? As it turned out,

Britain never acquired Poseidon, and it would be almost a generation before
she acquired access to a MIRV system in the Trident submarine agreement with

the United States. Nevertheless , it should be noted, Britain"s refusal of Poseidon

was, for the most part, involuntary. Despite Dr. Henry Kissinger"s November

1979 BBC interview with Michael Charlton in which Kissinger recalled his own

urging of Poseidon on the British while he was Secretary of State, another view
holds that even though Kissinger at that time "did not refuse Britain Poseidon,"

neither "did he press it on them. Instead, he spoke at some length on the

obstacles to this purchase. SALT, he explained, was the least of these. The

anns-control negotiations were beginning to move into qualitative restraints on
offensive arms, and the acquisition by Britain of the MIRVed Poseidon would

cause some difficulties. . . . The problem, he suggested, was more that Congress

was in an awkward mood on this sort of issue and was likely to refuse to
1 10
countenance the transfer of this particularly advanced piece of technology .
..

Furthennore, it would appear that "from 1 966 on a diminution of interest on

the American side could be detected. Admiral Hyman Rickover, in charge of

America"s sea-based deterrent, wanted to limit the infonnation exchanges" then
prevailing between the U.S. and Britain. l l l

H we are to accept this contention, then, for Britain. acceptance of Poseidon

had never been a live option, regardless of her real wishes or interests in the
matter. Rather, the withholding of Poseidon from Britain was an act of policy

by the United States government, Kissinger"s "congressional" escape clause
1 12
notwithstanding.

Thus cut off, and recalling the covert atomic development program under

Attlee, Britain at great expense secretly designed, developed, and deployed a

replacement for the Polaris missile, the Chevaline. The Chevaline Program had

as its objective a redesigned warhead for the Polaris missile. Chevaline"s
development, announced in January 1980, reconfirmed Britain"s position as a
26
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key player in the nuclear arena. The

Financial 1imes Science Editor, David

Fishlock, observed that Chevaline's development "has now brought Britain
abreast of the latest u.s. developments in warheads for ballistic missi les."

I 13

This achievement was crucial for the strategic assets Britain was able to secure

from the United States as a result. Lawrence Freedman has observed the
dynamics of this process and concluded that:

If Britain fell behind in nuclear research then its ability to enter into or sustain

reciprocal, cooperative relationships with other nations would be impaired. This
was relevant . . . to the continuation of the existing close ties with the United
States . .

1 1"

.

.

Thus Britain's special relationship in nuclear weapons with the United
States may be viewed as a function of British technical expertise in the
fabrication of strategic-caliber weaponry. That relationship could just as
well be as reciprocal as one given to singularity. In this connection, Britain
was invited to participate in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative Program
"Star Wars." The U.S. government in 1 985 gave assurances to the British on
technology transfer of Star Wars research products. Both governments
agreed on eighteen areas of technology "in which Britain is considered
particularly well qualified" to participate in SOl research. Some of these are
of interest, e.g., ballistic missile command, control, and communications
(i.e., C3); laser radar, vibrometry and imaging; sensors; interceptor research;

radar research; countermeasures; laser, particle beam, and radio frequency
1 15
lethality, vulnerability, and hardening.
The British minister of defence at the time, Michael Heseltine, declared that
while the missile system for the Trident was already developed (Britain would
manufacture her own warheads), "in the case of the SOl program . . . the U.S.
came to Britain and asked if the British would participate."

I 16

This request was obviously based on Britain's demonstrated capability.

Indeed, by 1 989 British Ministry of Defence scientists were convinced that
"Britain could develop a Star Wars antiballistic missile defense system based
on existing weapons which would be capable of protecting British nuclear
bases" from attack.

I 17

Thus, the special relationship itself emerges as a functional component of
British strategic deterrence doctrine. The paradox here, of course, was the fact
that the reciprocity achieved in Star Wars was achieved out of the consequences
resulting from the American denial of the Poseidon system to Britain in the first
27
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place. The Poseidon affair was, in a sense, Skybolt redux, but with an even

larger payoff for Britain:
•
•
•

Chevaline
Star Wars participation
Acquisition of the Trident System

The fmal paradox was the utilization of Chevaline 's succesful
s
development

as the chief strategic asset and bargaining counter in the British bid

to acquire

Trident, the most advanced seabome MIRV system yet produced by the United

States. Unlike Britain in its prior experience with Poseidon, the U.S. was foR:ed

by the capability inherent in Chevaline
Trident IT ballistic missile system.

l IS

to heed Britain's call for access to the

Nor could the Americans default on the

promised delivery of Trident, as they had previously on Skybolt, or obfuscate,

as with Poseidon. Past history was obviously very much on the minds of "senior

Ministry of Defence sources," as reported in The TImes (London) :

The sources were adamant that if the U.S. decided to develop a new missile and
no longer wanted to deploy Trident fi, ..that eventuality is covered by the
agreement." The!, said: '"There is no question of the U.S. pulling the rug from
under our feet. "I

,

It is just here that once again the question of American reliability was injected

into the picture by British officials. The American decision to supply Britain with

Trident, rather than allaying suspicions as might have been expected, only inten
20
sified British "worries about the future re1iabi1ity of the United States as an ally ... 1
Prime Minister Thatcher's caveat in the exchange of letters with President Carter

of 10 July 1980, it will be recalled, was highly revealing, echoing as it did Harold

Macmillan's Nassau declaration. Mrs. Thatcher declared that the Trident strategic

missile would likewise be assigned to NATO, "except where the United Kingdom

may decide that supreme national interests are at stake... 121 In that situation, Britain

might have to rely on its own devices without reference to the United States, or for
that matter anyone else. President Kennedy 's admission shortly after Nassau

is

therefore highly revealing in this connection : '"The British will have their deterrent.

It will be independent in moments of great national peril, which is really the only
22
time you consider using nuclear weapons anyway ... 1 So much for the NATO gloss

placed on the Statement of Use by Prime Ministers Thatcher and Macmillan; their

caveat told the tale. However, even the gloss was too much for John Nott, minister
of defence in the Thatcher Government, as he discarded it in favor of a bold

statement of British sovereign independence with reference to the use of nuclear

weapons:
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I'm not buying it [the Trident D-5] for NATO. In the last resort we must be able
alone. I'm greatly in favor of the Alliance, but you can never teU, and I
can't be sure that the Alliance will be as healthy in 20 years' time as it is today. 123

to stand

John Nott's feelings were shared by his Cabinet colleagues, as recalled by Peter
Hennessy in The

Times:

The five ministers who sat on Mrs. Thatcher's Polaris replacement committee,
7, are of an age where "standing alone" in 1940 was a personal and
formative experience.

MISC

Is not their devotion to the deterrent, and the feeling of those of a similar
background in the defense community, an instructive wish for insurance against
a rerun of the Battle of Britain summer? For clever "boffins" applying radar and
breaking the Luftwaffe's codes one can read "eggheads" at Aldermaston and
communications experts in bunkers beneath the Chilterns, and for brave young

men in Spitfires substitute youthful commanders in submarines lurking beneath
the North Atlantic, as aU that stands between a Britain bereft of allies and the
enemy along the Channel ports.

Whitehall would never resort to using the "national sovereignty" argument, unless
it looked like losing the debate once and for aU, for fear ofupsetting the United States.
But it was WlCertainty about our allies in the future that lay behind the decision of
MIse 7 on Trident as surely as it was the imperative guiding Mr. Attlee ' s Cabinet
94 .IU
Committee when it decided to build the first British bomb in 1 7

No wonder, then, that British leaders have been particularly worried about the

reliability of the United States. During the Cold War, one area where American

reliability was an issue of concern was that of nuclear reassurance for Britain and

for Europe. This issue sparked British angst and a challenge to the United States.

Even as the Cold War faded, American constancy was being tested at a substtategic
level, with Western European nations

demanding

an American commitment to

send troops to Bosnia, albeit in a peace-keeping capacity, not as an expeditionary

force to wage war. Nevertheless, as the record attests, angst over the constancy of
American commitment often became the occasion for revealing insights into
British strategic doctrine and policy management

Litmus Test 14: The Nuclear Umbrella for Europe

In evidence submitted to the Parliamentary Expenditure Committee by the

Ministry of Defence in 1 975, the independent nuclear deterrent was justified as

"an element of insurance, and reassurance to our European allies, against any
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weakening of the United States nuclear guarantee. .. I 25 What was so striking

about this assertion was the fact that just two years after fonnally joining the
European Economic Community

(EEC) . Great Britain was explicitly asserting

her intention to provide a nuclear umbrella for Western Europe should the
United States ever suffer a loss of nerve or commitment. Here. then. the
circumstances were clearly

drawn:

In the last resort, if the Alliance was to collapse. the possession of an independent

strategic weapon provides the United Kingdom with the means of preserving
national security by deterring large scale conventional or nuclear attack or of
1 216
countering nuclear blackmail.
In the final analysis. since such circumstances under the alliance system were

contingent upon American intent. any formal doctrinal articulation on Britain's
127
behalf "involved questioning the word and good faith of the United States. ..
Nevertheless . American reliability was questioned by Britain's leaders. In this

case. the tocsin was sounded by Neville Trotter. a Conservative

MP. A

memorandum submitted to the Expenditure Committee by Trotter warned:

With the Soviets now in a position of equality . . . it seems much less certain that
U.S. President would be prepared to commit his country to the horrors of major
nuclear attack if Britain rather than America was the subject of an initial nuclear
assault. We must. therefore. continue to possess our own capability for nuclear
1 28
retaliation.
Trotter's admonition was reiterated by Geoffrey Pattie.

MP. then Under

secretary of State for Defence in the Thatcher Government: "The readiness of
the United States to defend continental Western Europe with nuclear weapons
is now tempered by an American realization that the Soviet voice is as strong
as their own. In short, the guarantee of U.S. nuclear protection . . . is no longer
129
Pattie's fears were not entirely without foundation. if remarks by

reliable ...

former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger are to be believed. Kissinger spoke
in Brussels at a conference entitled "NATO: The Next 30 Years." jointly
sponsored by Georgetown University 's Center for Strategic and International
Studies and the Atlantic Institute. As reported in The New York Times for 3

September 1979. Kissinger admonished:

"Don't you Europeans keep asking us to multiply assurances we cannot possibly
mean and that if we do mean. we should not want to execute. and which if we
execute. would destroy our civilization. .
30
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"Massive assured destruction created

a paradoxical world in which it is the
liberal, humane and progressive country that is advocating the most blood-thirsty
strategy." He [i.e., Kissinger] strongly implied that he believed a United States
President would now decline to defend Europe by ordering such an assault
against Russian cities at a time when the Soviet Union had the means to strike
back at United States population centers in return.

"Of course, the U.S. President will threaten massive destruction in a crisis, but
will he do it?" Dr. Kissinger asked. "We must face the fact that it is absurd to
base the strategy of the West on the credibility of mutual suicide."1lO
In Henry Kissinger's view, therefore, Western Europe-Britain included
might be expendable in a nuclear showdown. The United States, in the fmal

analysis. might act to save herself. even if this meant offering Western Europe

up as sacrifice. The gauntlet thrown at the Western alliance by Dr. Kissinger
would appear to have been accepted by Geoffrey Pattie. Before accepting his

initial responsibility in the Thatcher government as Minister for the Royal Air

Force, Pattie wrote, as if in direct rebuttal to Kissinger:

It is no more than a blinding glimpse of the obvious to say that a guarantee which
is no longer automatic is no longer a guarantee and despite the presence of U.S.
forces on the ground in Europe in no way can there now be said to be an American
I
nuclear guarantee protecting Western Europe. 13
If Americ a ' s stewardship over the nuclear umbrella had become

problemati c , then Great Britain would accept the challenge. Mrs. Thatcher's
predecessor, James Callaghan, had advised President Carter at the Guadeloupe

Summit in January 1979 that "a U.K. nuclear capacity was important to Alliance

cohesion at a time of growing German doubts about the American nuclear
guarantee in an era of superpower parity." I 32 As Callaghan would recall in his

memoirs:
. . . Britain had a responsibility not only for her own defense; we shared a

responsibility for the defense of Europe.

.

.

.

It would be necessary to take into

account not only Britain's security but also the extent to which Germany felt the
need for

reassurance.

133

Britain 's security interests, therefore, required her to provide a nuclear urnbrella
for Europe. The concurrence of the other Western European nations in that

appreciation is a factor of some significance, since they appear to be reassu red

by British policy.
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United States "Reliability" as Theme,
Context, and Occasion: A Reconsideration
The conceptual place of American reliability in British deterrence doctrine

has been explored at some length in this inquiry. As theme, context, and

occasion for possesis on of an independent nuclear deterrent, reliability has
served the British well

in doctrinal and policy management terms.

Indeed, the doctrinal definition of United States "reliability" has consider

ably widened from the cballenge posed by the passage of the McMahon Act of

1 946 to the explicit references by Prime Minister Callaghan to the need of a

British nuclear umbrella for the reassurance Europe so badly desired. Certainly,
British fears in this direction may have been groundless . However, in the British

view, those fears were genuine, hence doctrinally sound. The United States will

have no choice but to live with the strategic implications of this British

assesm
s ent, even if it means the possibility of an alternative design for European

security over the horizon.

Perhaps it is well to consider this issue in a more basic context. When World

War II ended, the United States enjoyed a monopoly on atomic weapons as well

as a profound disinclination to share them with any other power, including Great
Britain. The United States position may be understood in terms of a classical

application of raw political power. The fifth century B.C. Greek historian,
Thucydides, described the power calculus in his account of the Melian
Dialogue: "Right, as the world goes, is in question only between equals

in

power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they
must." 1 34

Applied to the postwar world, the power calculus that drove American
policymakers to "do what they can" to deny any further nuclear cooperation

with the British was matched by a no less determined British compulsion, as
the weaker power, to "suffer what they must," while at the same time trying to

redress the imbalance at whatever cost. It was a dispute that in any

case could

not be avoided. Professor Margaret Gowing has captured the dynamics of the
then prevailing power relationship with great accuracy:

H the Angl�American atomic agreements drafted early in 1946 had been

endorsed they would in no way have altered the decision to produce
plutonium, . . . It is conceivable that if the agreement had been signed and if
henceforth Angl�American relations had been bathed in sweetness and light,
arrangements might have been made for the pooling of atomic weapons produc
tion. But in view of the actual American mood at this time, such a possibility is
not worth even a cursory exploration . As it was, American atomic attitudes in
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this period hardened Britain·s resolution not to be bullied out of the business and

not to acquiesce in an American monopoly. 135

American action and British reaction are thus understandable in tenns of the
Thucydidean paradigm. that it was the power calculus that defined the relations
between states. It, rather than moral, ethical, or sentimental notions governed
the definition of state interest and security on both sides. The United States

could no more share her nuclear weapons with Great Britain than Great Britain
could surrender her sovereign right to independently acquire nuclear weapons.
The dynamics of the power relationships between states were starkly drawn in

the historical reconstruction offered by Thucydides in the Melian Dialogue. In
the Dialogue, which occurred as a brief incident in the epic twenty-seven year
Peloponnesian War, the Athenian envoys would advise the doomed Melian
satellite of Sparta of the brutal realities that made up power politics:
And it is not as if we were the ftrst to make this law, or to act upon it when made:
We found it existing before us and shall leave it to exist for ever [sic] after us;
all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you . . . and everybody else, having
the same power as we have, would do the same as we do. 136

Applied to our own time, American nuclear policy vis-a-vis Britain, has bred

a generation of basic mistrust, notwithstanding the agreements and close
cooperation in nuclear weapons research and development. The Anglo

American modus vivendi, the agreement of 1958 regarding "Cooperation on the
Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes," and the Polaris and
Trident agreements, do nothing to change the picture. This sense of United
States unreliability was forged early and was sustained by subsequent policy

actions. Such a perception, reinforced as it has been, has given to British nuclear

deterrence doctrine a theme, a context, and occasion for policy management.
While

this

topic remains delicate, it can by no means be ignored. In the

meantime, underpinning all doctrinal considerations, there must be the main

tenance of an assured destruction capability.

The Maintenance of Credibility
The credibility of any strategic nuclear deterrent must, in the final analysis,
rest upon its capacity to inflict assured destruction upon an enemy. Close behind
possession itself, a perception of this capability by allies and adversaries alike
is essential for deterrence to operate. The key operative element, therefore,
is a destructive capacity that is assured and recognized by those whose
33
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responsibility it is to be aware of such matters. For almost all of its existence
as an independent deterrent force, Britain's strategic nuclear ann has possessed
this character.
During most of the Cold War period, the overriding strategic imperative for
Britain was the pursuit of her so-called "Moscow Option, .. or the "Criterion,"
the belief "that it is absolutely vital for the Soviet capital to be [credibly]
threatened at all times .. 137 To be credible, the threat posed to the Soviet Union
by Britain would perforce have to be a unilateral one, i.e., a nuclear-anned
Britain acting alone against the Soviet Union. In the following scenario, Soviet
leaders were asked to consider the consequences of such a catastrophe for their
country:
.

If you should ever attack us, we have the capacity to punish you, even after the
event, by destroying this many of your cities, and consequently part of your
industry and population. This would not only be a grievous blow in itself, but
would materially weaken your capacity to withstand successfuly
l an attack from
the United States which, for the urposes of this argument you will have to
E
assume would be a separate actor. 38

The above remarks reveal a glimpse of a core element in British strategic
deterrence doctrine: retributive force. Some years ago, it was noted that this
capability for retributive force in Britain's strategic arsenal compelled Soviet
"rationality" in the Cold War:
The Polaris force has commonly been described as an "anti-city" deterrent,
threatening to retaliate by killing civilian citizens of an aggressor state. The threat
is not negligible; the nuclear warheads fired by, say, two British SSBNs [i .e ,
Polaris submarines] might kill anything up to 15-20 million people in the Soviet
Union. Even one SSBN could effectively hold 10- 1 5 million Soviet citizens
hostage. In fact, however, the threat is still more extensive than that alone may
suggest, since with only slightly different targeting, the same force could also
destroy anything up to a quarter of the Soviet Union's industrial capacity. The
level of threat presented by the existing force might be thought, therefore, to .
deter a rational Soviet leadership from attacking Britain. 1 39
.

.

.

The extent to which the Soviets were in fact deterred in this way by Great
Britain is one of the great if unsung achievements of the Cold War. Lord
Chalfont, the former AIun Gwynne Jones, had been Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs from 1964 to 1970. Although his comments on Soviet vul
nerability as well as his operational deftnition of credibility were made in 1980,
they are worth repeating:
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One of the principal elements in the effectiveness or "credibility" of the nuclear
deterrent is the degree of uncertainty which it creates in the mind of the potential
aggressor.
In this context, Soviet leaders would be unlikely to "expect to ward
. . .

off successfully" attacks on "large areas of key importance to them." The

Soviet
Union has one dubiously effective and obsolescent ballistic missile defense
system around Moscow; the remainder of its cities are unprotected. l40
Britain's task in the Cold War was therefore to strive continuously to keep

the qualitative level of her deterrent high enough to ensure its credibility. When,
therefore, Moscow began to build an ABM shield around Moscow, the British
saw an immediate threat to the credibility of their "Moscow Option." Britain's

141
response was the Chevaline Program .
Sir Hennan Bondi, Chief Scientific

Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, has explained the "strategic rationale"
behind Chevaline in tenns of the weapon system's qualitative dimension: the
improvement of the Polaris warhead to maintain Britain's Moscow Option.
Thus, whatever anti-ballistic missile defenses the Soviets might deploy, Mos
cow would remain vulnerable to British destruction

in

any case. Observed

Bondi:
For us [Britain] to resign ourselves to have a capability that is not only
quantitatively small but qualitatively second-rate would severely diminish
the political effect within the Alliance of having a deterrent at all. So the
"Moscow Criterion" goes rather far. It's rather important in the context of
Alliance politics . . . .
[T]he enonnous importance of Moscow in the Soviet Union is quite clear. So
abandoning the "Moscow Criterion" would be a very severe reduction in what one
might call '"the quality of the deterrent" and its prime task of helping to keep the

peace. 142

Thus, for Britain to possess a qualitatively first-rate deterrent capability was as

important politically within the alliance, vis-i-vis the United States, as it was

strategically to deter the Soviet Union. In the achievement of both missions, the
qualitative level of the deterrent itself underwrote its credibility.
The maintenance of the deterrent's capability was very much what Prime

Minister Thatcher had in mind

in a

1979 speech, as she warned the Soviets to

tread cautiously around Britain's vital interests. "Let me be clear," admonished

Mrs. Thatcher:

The Russians do not publish their intentions. So we must judge them by their
military capabilities. I doubt whether any Russian leader would easily con
template a repetition of the immense sufferings through which his country went
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is up to \IS to ensure that there is no doubt in his
mind that this-and worse-would now be the price of any Soviet adventure.
That is what we mean when we talk of maintaining the credibility of our defensive
l43
forces. To do this is well within our economic and technical capacity.
less than forty years ago. But it

Thatcher's speech is significant because it encapsulates the major elements
of British deterrence doctrine:
•

The intention to unilaterally inflict retributive counter-city force upon the

Soviets, should the provocation be great enough. Note well, the threat was not

only to repeat the devastation of World War n but that even worse damage
"would now be the price of any Soviet adventure."
•

The promise of assured destructive capability in Britain's nuclear arsenal

was also present, i.e., ..that is what we mean when we talk of maintaining the
credibility of our defensive forces."
•

Also made explicit was Britain's independent nuclear standing, vis-i-vis

her "economic and technical capacity."

On this last point, Mrs. Thatcher failed to reveal the imminent achievement

of British technology to manufacture tritium independently-a hydrogen

isotope used to fabricate thermonuclear warheads. When fused with deuterium,

a stable hydrogen isotope, tritium serves as an explosive in hydrogen weapons.
Since tritium enjoys a half-life of only 12.3 years, a continuous supply is
required. Since Britain had been wholly reliant on the U.S. for its supply of
tritium under the 1958 agreement regarding "Cooperation on the Uses of

Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes," it was a momentous occasion
when in January 1980 Britain announced the commissioning of its ftrst tritium
separation plant at Chapelcross . Tritium production was scheduled to begin that
spring 144
.

This was no small achievement in scientific terms, since the production of

tritium is both costly and complicated, involving the cooling of lithium rods

and the complex extraction of tritium. In fact, the extraction process adopted

by the British was revealed as a new one which allowed tritium to be produced
145
less expensively.
David Fishlock, of the Financial nmes, commenting on
the significance of the event, noted that the new plant "will be making all of the
tritium Britain expects to need, both for nuclear weapons and for peaceful
146
uses
Britain 's motivation for taking this step was explicitly one of
...

capability and credibility enhancement through self-sufficiency. Dr. Lawrence
Freedman, then Head of Policy Studies at the Royal Institute of International
Affairs, suggested ..that the decision to become self-sufficient in tritium grew
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out of concern with the anti-proliferation mood in the United States and the

possibility of more stringent controls on the transfer of all nuclear fuels ... 147

Such concerns were very real in the minds of British officials at this time.

for it had not been three years since the revelation that President Carter was
inclined to refuse renewal of the twenty-year Anglo-American nuclear coopera

tion treaty. set to expire in 1978. This predisposition had created grave ap

prehensions in the minds of British officials. for such a move by the government
of the United States would not only have prohibited the transfer of nuclear fuels

and technology but forbidden as well continued H-bomb tests by Britain at the

underground U.S. Department of Energy test site in Nevada. Hence. the

practical effect of such a non-renewal would be to place a developmental freeze
on the technological evolution of Britain's independent deterrent. by turning

the special relationship back to the period before the 1 958 nuclear cooperation

agreement. 148 That Britain had been aware of American inclinations was

demonstrated in her announcement early in 1976 that she intended to manufac
ture tritium in the United Kingdom. When this intention was fmally realized

four years later. it was justified on explicitly strategic grounds: "In return for

its investment in tritium. Britain has brought security of supply of a strategically
important material for which previously it was wholly reliant on the U.S ... 149

Passing almost unnoticed at the same time was the brief announcement that

Britain had also embarked upon a production schedule to process highly
!1O
enriched uranium "for the fltSt time since 1963 . .. 1 Britain would. in this case.

be utilizing a gas centrifuge process. "largely to ensure a supply of fuel for the

power plants of nuclear submarines . .. 1.51 While both technical developments

were "not linked to any specific weapons program . . . [they nevertheless point

to] a continuing interest in sustaining a capability for nuclear weapons produc
tion. .. 1.52 Perhaps most of all. they underlined the sophistication of Britain's

scientific and technological infrastructures and the decisive role played by both
in the maintenance of Britain's assured destructive capability.

New Directions: A Substrategic
Role for Strategic Systems
As Sir Michael Howard recently observed, ..the Soviet Union has disap

peared like the Demon King at the end of a pantomime. .. 1 .53 With the disintegra

tion of Soviet power. the Cold War came to an end. Saddam Hussein 's invasion

of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf war that ensued inaugurated a new era in world
affairs. Threats to international peace and security could now also emanate from
the vacuum created in the fonner Soviet Union and in that Union's fonner vassal
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states along the periphery of Russia. The violent implosion of Yugoslavia

heralded the return of ..the Balkans .. to world history, along with the horrifying

possibility for wider conflict in Europe. North Korea, with an incipient nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile program, also posed a threat to world peace .

In this anarchic environment,

The Times of London proposed

in a leading

editorial that "Britain has lost an enemy and has not yet found a role. What is
needed

is not a cumbersome defense review

changing world. ..

154

. . . but a rolling response to the

British defense policy makers have determined upon such

a "rolling response" to the new world order by adjusting their deterrence

doctrine to meet the challenge of sea changes in the international system. The

British have developed a substrategic role for the new Trident II ballistic
missile, which will enter Royal Navy service in 1995. This role will continue
alongside the primary mission of the Trident II, which

is

that of strategic

deterrence.

Britain, it would appear, has adopted a strategy to be directed against a

potential nuclear-armed rogue country, to deter it "from gambling on the

calculation that nobody would contemplate using the full force of strategic arms
against it.

.. 1 SS

According to Royal Navy sources, once the Trident submarines

were deployed,

they could go to sea with a "mix-and-match" missile load, some strategic and
some tactical. A potential aggressor would be warned that he could face a limited
tactical strike from a Trident submarine unless he backed off. The sources said
that if an aggressor was not sure whether he faced a tactical strike "or Armaged
don," the doubt would increase the deterrent value. 156
According to Malcolm Rifkind, the British minister of defence, "it was

essential for Britain to keep full-scale strategic nuclear arms and less potent

sub-strategic weapons ...
weapon systems.

IS7

Trident would be configured to accommodate both

Speaking at the Center for Defence Studies at Kings College,

London, Rifkind revealed that in accordance with the new doctrine he had "set
a ceiling of 96 nuclear warheads per [Trident] submarine." The actual number
deployed could, however, be "significantly fewer" than ninety-six, noted the

defence minister. In any event, he was quick to point out that ..the total explosive
power deployed on Trident would be 'not much changed' from Polaris . ..

1S8

An interesting, indeed paradoxical sidelight to this development was the fact
that in November 1993, the British government announced it was abandoning
plans to develop a tactical nuclear stand-off missile for the Royal Air Force

the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM). This system would have cost "at
least" £1.8 billion, and the Royal Navy convinced the government that Trident
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would be "sufficiently flexible and reliable to take on a secondary substrategic
u9
role."
In lieu of the TASM system, the current upgraded WEl77 nuclear
gravity bomb carried in Tornado aircraft will be kept in service until the next
century. Thus, Britain will retain strategic capability in both her airborne and
seaborne systems.
It would appear that Britain has chosen to cope with the uncertainties
of the new world order by adapting her strategic deterrent to meet all levels
of threat and to utilize her primary strategic deterrent, the Trident, in
strategic as well as substrategic roles. What remains to be seen is whether

this reconfiguration of doctrine and system will bring stability to the inter
national system or be a destabilizing element. Regardless of the outcome,

one thing is clear: in assuming this new posture, Britain has sent a message

founded upon the ftrst principles noted at the outset of our inquiry into the
evolution of British deterrence doctrine. That message is that functional threats
to British interests will be resisted. Now, however, the scale of that resistance
will be deliberately left in doubt, so the potential adversary will be forced to
consider an even greater number of adverse developments resulting from
actions he might take.
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that even a substrategic nuclear response by

Britain will constitute a momentous strategic rejoinder to a potential adversary.

In the meantime, such considerations reveal the complexity and diversity of
British deterrence doctrine and policy-of how they evolved and into what they

evolved. Both doctrine and policy, however, require instruments to secure their

realization. The forging of those instruments offers a revealing insight into the
British political and defense cultures as nuclear weapons were developed.
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Forging the Instruments

Secrecy as Strategy

O

F

TRANSCENDENT IMPORTANCE in Britain's experience with an

independent nuclear deterrent has been .. the process by which it was
attained ... 1 60 The leitmotif of that process was secrecy.

Since time immemorial, rulers have devised a variety of institutional and
procedural techniques to preserve their secrets and to reach decisions. Such

procedures insulate the decisional process behind a cloak of discretion so that
adversaries will be kept ignorant of capabilities and intentions. On another

level, by disseminating only such mind-shaping information or propaganda as
the top political elites desire, an ambience or facade is erected behind which
substantive policies

can be pursued without attracting undue public attention.

The seventeenth-century British statesman and philosopher Francis Bacon
identified the principle thus:
Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret and retired in both these
respects in which things are deemed secret; for some things are secret because
they are hard to know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all
161
governments as obscure and invisible.

In any discussion of secrecy in the context of the British system, there
are cultural and systemic contexts to consider beyond the political or legal
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institutional arrangements. Some years ago, the American sociologist Edward
Shils observed in this connection:
Although democratic and pluralistic, British society is not populist. Great Britain
is a hierarchical country. Even when it is distrusted, the Government, instead of
being looked down upon, as it often is in the United States, is, as such, the object
of deference because the Government is still suffused with the symbol of
monarchical and aristocratic society . . . .
The citizenry and all but the most aggressively alienated members of the elite do
not regard it as within their prerogative to unmask the secrets of the Government,
except under very stringent and urgent conditions. . . .
The secrets of the governing classes of Britain are kept within the class and even
within more restricted circles. The British ruling class is unequalled in secretive
ness and taciturnity. Perhaps no ruling class in the Western World, certainly no
ruling class in any democratic society, is as close mouthed as the British ruling
class. No ruling class discloses as little of its confidential proceedings as does
1 62
the British.
The above observation applies with a particular aptness to matters nuclear.
C.P. Snow-novelist, scientist, and Civil Service Commissioner with special
responsibility for the Scientific Civil Service-described the context in his
fictional account of Britain·s wartime atomic bomb project, The New Men. 1 63
The protagonist, Lewis Eliot, serves as a temporary civil servant, a personal
assistant to Cabinet Minister Thomas Bevill. Bevill is Chainnan of confidential
scientific committees and thus is privy to the most secret infonnation. In the
fall of 1939 Eliot, along with a colleague , is summoned to attend the minister
in his Whitehall office. The dialogue that follows is so evocative of British
discretion that it merits our attention:
. . . The first thing, said the Minister, was to forget all about the official hierarchy,
the next was to forget that you had any relatives. If you possess a secret, he said,
your secretary may have to know: But not your second-in-command : And not
your wife . . . . 164

Forget all I tell you until you have to remember-that's what I do. But the stuff
to watch is what they call a uranium isotope.
He said the words slowly as though separating the syllables for children to spell .
..u .235," he added. . . . Bevill [then] showed us his private dossier of the uranium
project. We must not refer to it again by that name, he said: As with all other
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projects of high secrecy, he carried out the "appreciations" in his own hand,
keeping no copies: The documents were then mounted in a loose-leaf cover, on
which he printed a pet name. . . .
He turned the cover, and we saw, printed in bold capitals, the words:
MR.. TOAD. I6S

The ambience is so characteristic of the British, recalling the devilishly

naughty high spirits found among boys in the great public schools. But more
than that, it was also symbolic of the extraordinary secrecy maintained during

the war, which continued in the cold peace that followed. Secrecy has remained

the modality of choice for British prime ministers in the realm of nuclear

weapons. A number of elaborate, even extraordinary, procedures have been

instituted over the years for the taking of decisions on nuclear weaponry and
then for the covert measures necessary to implement such decisions.

In the beginning, for example, Lord Portal, controller of Atomic Energy

Production within the Ministry of Supply, reported directly to the prime
minister:

Portal felt that secrecy was the overriding consideration. It was not only a
question of keeping the technical secrets from other nations, though that was very
important. There was also the general political aspect. Was there, for national or
international reasons, any object in conceding the fact that Britain was working
on the development of the atomic bomb? Finally, there was the Anglo-American
aspect. Hopes of getting help from the United States "under the counter" might
depend on their assesm
s ent of British secrecy arrangements. If, as it seemed, the
whole business was thrice secret it would be unwise to throw the bomb require
ments into the nonna} departmental machinery for weapons development. Hence
the proposal for the Portal-Penney arrangement, with Portal as the channel for
communication for the Chiefs of Staff and Penney's work camouflaged under a
misleading name such as "basic high explosive research." The Chiefs of Staff
agreed to suppress any reference in their Ministries to details of manufac
ture
. 166
.

.

.

When, therefore, Britain could no longer avoid a decision on manufacturing an

atomic bomb, a secret and specially convened Ministerial Committee of the

Cabinet, known as GEN 163, took the fateful decision. Jo ining the prime
minister at No. 10 Downing Street on the afternoon of 8 January 1947 were

Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary; Herbert Morrison, Lord President; A.V.

Alexander, Minister of Defence; Viscount Addison, Dominions Secretary; and

John Wilmot, Minister of Supply. 1 67 It is important to note that this ad hoc
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committee met against a backdrop of severe economic crises for Britain;

factories were closing down because they bad no coal, economic rationing was

still in place, and general living conditions for the average citizen were

miserable. Notwithstanding this economic climate and the enormous outlays

that would necessarily follow a decision to proceed, Hugh Dalton, Chancellor

:, President

of the Exchequer, was not in attendance, nor were Sir Stafford Crip
of the Board of Trade or Arthur Greenwood, the Lord Privy Seal. 1

Only three

copies of the minutes of the meeting were made. Before the committee were

directions on two points: Should research and development of nuclear weapons

begin? H so, were "special arrangements" for the project to be adopted? Such
arrangements would be similarly discreet, if not actually covert. On the fllSt
point, Bevin, the influential foreign secretary, said "it was important that Britain
should press on with the study of all aspects of atomic energy. 'We could not
afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this new development .. 169
,

The GEN 163 Committee, therefore, took the decision to begin research and
development on atomic weapons. On the second point before the Committee,
the special arrangements necessary for secret development were adopted. So
secret were they that only five or six senior officials outside Portal's organiza
tion ever knew of their existence. Indeed, Dr. Penney, one of the key actors in

the drama, "did not know of this ministerial meeting in January 1947 and was
not told to go ahead until the following May .. I70
.

H the Cabinet in its collectivity bad been excluded from this decision, so too

was Parliament Just after Winston Churchill returned to power in 195 1 , he paid
"tribute to his predecessor [Attlee] for making the initial decision and sanction
ing the huge expenditures that bad never been revealed to Parliament Very

soon it was common knowledge that this decision had been taken by Mr. Attlee

without any prior discussion in the Cabinet, and that he had never revealed it
to any but a handful of trusted friends ... 171 As Churchill put it, Attlee and his

colleagues had "preferred to conceal this vast operation and its fmance from
the scrutiny of the House; not even obtaining a vote on the principle in
volved

. ..

I 72

Attlee's practice with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons was to
prove paradigmatic. Since the Polaris missiles supplied to Great Britain by the
United States under the Nassau Agreement of 1962 were to enjoy a life-span
of twenty to twenty-five years, in the mid- 1970s the British again had to make
some highly secret, yet necessary, decisions on the future of their independent

nuclear deterrent This was achieved by another Labour prime minister, James

Callaghan. The latter set up a super secret Cabinet group on Polaris replacement,
which "supervised much of the technical and diplomatic preparations" for a
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fInal decision by a subsequent government. 173 Using this special Cabinet
structure, "Callaghan conftded in

only three

colleagues, who met at No. 10

Downing Street in conditions of strictest secrecy." The group included Dr.

David Owen, Foreign Secretary; Frederick Mulley, Minister of Defence; and
Dennis Healey, Chancellor of the Exchequer and a former Minister of Defence.

The balance of the Cabinet was excluded. Callaghan's covert actions were
publicly justified on grounds of a

Labour Party

election

campaign promise of

October 1 974 to forgo development of the third-generation British nuclear

deterrent after Polaris. 174 The prime minister, however, refused to allow a mere
electoral platform of his own

party to

interfere with his responsibility as the

Queen's First Minister, to act in defense of the realm.

upheld by a secret Ministerial Committee of four.

Raison d'etat prevailed,

As it happened, the Parliamentary debate over the interim Polaris system,
Chevaline, which took place in January 1 980, was "the fIrst time in 15 years

that MP's have debated Britain's nuclear forces ... 175 Likewise, Project
Chevaline had been characteristically "buried away each year in the other
research

and development item and elsewhere in the defense estimates ... 176 It

was not to be until January 1980, "almost six years after it was given the go

ahead" by the secret Cabinet committee, that Parliament would be told the actual

cost, £ I ,OOOm. I77

And in July 1980, Callaghan'S successor, Margaret Thatcher, a Conserva

tive, took the fInal decision to replace the Polaris system with a successor, also
purchased from the United States, Trident. The ministerial structure for taking

this decision was likewise highly secret and small, smaller in fact than Attlee's

GEN 1 63 Committee had been . First convened in the summer of 1 979, soon

after the Conservatives returned to power, Mrs. Thatcher's secret Ministerial
Committee, Mise 7, included Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary; Francis
Pym, Minister of Defence; Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chancellor of the Exchequer;
and William Whitelaw, Home Secretary . 178 As on an earlier occasion, not only

had the full Cabinet been excluded from a decision involving nuclear weapons,

but so had Parliament. In this case, the only concession the government made
was to inform Parliament of the fmal decision, after the fact. Just for the record,

William Rodgers, Chief Opposition Spokesman on Defence-in effect the

shadow defence minister-challenged the government's practice in a par
liamentary debate:

Neither the house nor the country has had such a privilege [i.e., of fully debating
Trident] because the information available to the Government has not been made
available on a wider scale. l79
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The reply of Francis Pym, the minister of defence, was instructive: "The way
in which the Government has considered this important matter and announced
its decision to the house is wholly in accordance with our parliamentary and
constitutional practice. .. 180 In any case, Pym added:
It is for the Government to come to its decisions and then to present them to the
House and to defend them there. We did arrange a debate in January. Mr. Rodgers
says it was not adequate, but it was on our initiative. . . . It was a useful occasion
as a preliminary to the decision I have announced today. III

Thus, full British Cabinets have been systematically excluded from some of
the most crucial strategic decisions taken by postwar governments, a procedure
that has eventuated across time, party, and ideology. While individual Members
of Parliament were doubtless informed about these developments in one way
or another over the years, Parliament as a collectivity has been even further
removed from knowledge, let alone the political luxury of a vote. The closest
Parliament came to debating a government decision on nuclear deterrence in
1980 was post/acto! In recent years the record has improved only marginally.

Dissimulation as Statecraft: The Thucydidean Paradigm
High policy concerns questions and issues relative to the survival of the state.

As such, high policy is characterized by a restriction of fundamental knowledge

in those contexts that concern life and death issues for the state. 182 Nuclear
weaponry is a topic suitable for classification as a high policy issue; hence, an
aura of great secrecy surrounds it in all political systems, Britain 's included.
The reason is obvious enough: the reality for a world in which sovereign
nation-states struggle for advantage and for survival itself is that truth will be
qualified, deliberately falsified, and otherwise contaminated by those having
the means at their disposal to do so. Thucydides chose to begin his fifth-century
B.C. history of the Peloponnesian War with perhaps this most important
principle of statecraft as his first lesson. It has since become a paradigm for
political behavior with reference to the great issues of war, peace, and survival
itself. As to why Athens and Sparta, along with their tributary allies, chose to
wage a mighty twenty-seven-year struggle for Hellenic hegemony, Thucydides
wrote:
The real cause I consider to be the one which was fonnally most kept out of sight.
The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in
II
Lacedaemon, made war inevitable. I
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All subsequent actions, therefore, were taken by Sparta either on behalf of or
as a counter to Athenian hegemonic aspirations, despite public justifications to

the contrary. The point is that the real casus belli was ..the one which was
formally most kept out of sight."

Many years ago, the American statesman Paul Nitze attempted to bridge the

historical gap between Thucydides' time and his own. Nitze suggested the
political institutionalization of the prevailing dichotomy between a
government's actual interests and whatever facade of words, slogans, and
ideologies it might choose to advance. Nitze, therefore, points out that for
governments ..the word 'policy ' is used in two related but different senses." In

one sense, ..the declaratory sense, it refers to policy statements which have as
their aim political and psychological effects." It is in the other sense, however,

..the action sense," that policy "refers to the general guidelines which we believe

should and will in fact govern our actions in various contingencies ... I 84 Thus,
while declaratory policy is perceived as operative by the mass public, including

the articulate elites, in fact it is not. On the other hand, action policy, perceived
or not perceived, is operative. The essential difference then between declaratory
and action policies is that they exist on different levels.
More to the point, Britain's greatest success in the policy management of an
operative strategic deterrence doctrine has been her mastery of declaratory
policy to obfuscate not only action policy but the strategic objectives inherent
in it. In so doing Britain has delivered a virtuoso performance .

Andrew J. Pierre was perhaps fmt to observe that British deterrence doctrine

was obscured behind a facade. He explained the practice in his defmitive study

of the British nuclear deterrent as, in part, "due to the nature of the British

political system [wherein] . . . 'declaratory ' policy tends to run ahead of
'action' policy . ..

l8S

The matter becomes clarified immediately if Nitze's for

mulation is adopted and Pierre's phrasing is amended to read: "Due to the nature
of the British political system . . . 'declaratory' policy tends to overshadow or

obscure 'action' policy." This policy modality captured the attention of British

defense strategists Peter Nailor and the late Colonel Jonathan Alford. 1 86 They

wrote that:
[Since British] Governments normally confine their explanations about strategic
nuclear weapons policy to short descriptions of current functions of the nuclear
forces . . . the annual British Defense White Papers, [and] the defense debates in

Parliament . . . the foreign policy debates that touch on this aspect of British
security concerns, yield relatively little about strategic purposes or security
doctrine. Certainly by comparison with the United States and French official
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explanations and legislative discussions, the material about the objectives of the
policy, rather than the capability to execute it, is thin. 117

Thus, what was obscured was neither hardware nor capability but doctrine and
the policy objectives on behalf of which such strategic hardware was deployed.
A recent study has concluded that "part of the explanation for the relative
neglect of British doctrines about nuclear strategy is that British thinking during

the post-war decade was mostly conducted at an official in-house level" and

hence was unavailable in the public domain for many years. 188 As such, for a

good many years, strategic questions were not given the kind of exposure in the

scholarly literature and in the political arena that they enjoyed in the United

States. This however is disputed by other evidence: the studious avoidance of
public parliamentary discussion was no accident. as Gowing has noted. "There
was ignorance, deliberately encouraged by the Government. about the inde

pendent deterrent. "189 The result of this pattern of reticence is a strategic
deterrence doctrine that has been left unarticulated.
H officially imposed secrecy and exegetical obtuseness have managed to
mask content and substance, so too has the conduct of public debate. Stepping
into the void left in British deterrence doctrine, and filling it for so many years,
has been "prestige." As a raison d 'etre for Britain's independent nuclear
deterrent. prestige has in fact come to serve as a substitute, even a facade, for

an explicitly articulated and coherent strategic deterrence doctrine. Prestige has
become an exemplar of dissimulation in the service of statecraft.
Ever since the British began to deploy their own nuclear weapons, British
society has been divided over the necessity for them. The question invariably
raised has been whether Great Britain

can

afford the vast capital outlays

necessary for the research, development. and deployment of nuclear weapon
systems, particularly when those systems are being duplicated by Britain's
closest ally, the United States. In the 1950s, some groups, such as Lord Russell 's
followers in the Committee of 1 00, demanded nuclear disannament. They
argued that. in addition to being a drain on vitally needed domestic resources,
Britain's nuclear program was a futile attempt to regain lost greatness as

decolonization advanced. Elements in the Labour Party rank and file agreed.
Paradoxically, many in the Conservative Party demanded an independent
nuclear deterrent for Great Britain on precisely the same grounds; national
prestige.
From the 1950s to the present. therefore, prestige has actually defmed the
tone and context for parliamentary debates, relative to the need for a distinctly
British nuclear deterrent. Analysts too have been quick to accept the premise;
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to cite one example of this

genre:

"Unlike the French, the British felt that the

magnitude of the American arsenal made the Atlantic connection essential.

Thus, to enhance their prestige, they wanted to play a key role alongside the
Americans in international affairs ... 190
While "prestige" may serve as an apologia for public consumption, it, like
"honor," has no basis on which to create substantive policy. Shakespeare, for

example, makes clear in

Henry IY that honor is just "for show." Accordingly,

Falstaff asks:

Can honor set to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wOWld?
No. Honor hath no skill in surgery then? No. What is honor? A word. What is
Air. 191
the word honor?
So, too, prestige. As an operational principle prestige is meaningless, since

in the context of world affairs it has no power to compel the obeisance of others

or even obtain a hearing; therefore, it secures no concrete objectives. On

reflection then, prestige is neither cause nor effect, only rhetoric-cunency
without value

except

as

pretext.

Were John Foster Dulles' dictum to be

applied- ..It has always been necessary to look behind words of individuals [in

this case, nations] to fmd from their actions what their true purpose is.. I92_
prestige would be revealed as a policy objective, thclaratory in nature.

Examination of the budgetary allocations voted by successive British
governments to secure an independent nuclear deterrent reveals that "prestige"
is not a satisfactory causal explanation. Governments, after all, institute ruthless
cost-benefit analyses to keep down expenditures. The enonnous costs relative
to the research, development, and deployment of atomic and thennonuclear
weapons preclude prestige as an authoritative sanction. Embarking on such a
course demands huge infrastructural investments in the chemical, electrical,
and metallurgical sectors. 193
Substantive evidence of such investment should definitively factor out
prestige as an operative element in Britain's strategic calculus. For example,
the detonation of Britain's first atomic bomb at Monte Bello on 3 October 1 952

had been a very expensive moment indeed. Gowing assessed the achievement
as

"an extraordinary research and industrial effort involving £ 1 50 million or so

of expenditure... 194 In 1 952, Great Britain spent some 9.9 percent of her gross
l9S
national product (GNP) on defense.
Given the severe postwar austerity
program to which Britain had subjected herself since 1 945, coupled with the
higher valuation of the pound sterling relative to the dollar then, and Britain's
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willingness to defend her currency whatever the domestic costs-these invest

ments were of considerable magnitude.
The United States agreed to supply the British with Polaris ballistic missiles
in December 1 962. One authoritative source recalled that "the original Polaris
force, excluding its operating expenses, cost Britain something like £ 1 ,600
million [Le., £ 1 .6 billion] at 1976 prices... I96 In 1980, "Britain's annual expen
diture on research, development and demonstration (R, D & D) [was] close to
$ 10 billion, of which

197

central government [was] providing more than 50 per

cent ..
In a survey of British technology, Mervosh and Fishlock conceded
this figure to be "relatively high compared with other major industrialized
countries ... I98 Most important of all, they noted, "about 50 percent of it is
199
Not surprising, then, is the fact that "defense is a
directed toward defense ...
major industry in Britain. The nation [in 1980] spent 4.9 percent of its gross
national product on defense, a higher proportion than any NATO nation except
the U.S . . . . Expenditure on defense R & D [in 1980] was estimated at $3.3
200
billion.,,
Thus, one gets a much clearer insight into British defense allocations
over time: 4.9 percent of GNP allocated to defense appears paltry by comparison
with the 1 952 outlay of 9.9 percent, but actually quite the reverse is the case.
The British are currently getting far more for their defense spending as a
percentage of GNP allocated to the strategic deterrent than it would appear at
first glance. Evidence for this contention will be found in the data analysis
presented in the appendix.
The Chevaline Program to extend the life of Britain's Polaris submarines
was first revealed in January 1980. Defence Minister Pym noted the cost to
develop and deploy Chevaline had been £ 1 billion, or about $ 2 billion.101 Any
doubts about funding sources were dispelled by Pym himself, who declared that
the Chevaline Project had been "funded and managed entirely by the United
Kingdom...202
Despite the fact that the planning for Chevaline had originated under a
Conservative government after 1970, the biggest expenditures on the project
203

fell after Labour's return to power in 1974.
Original cost estimates authorized
204
by the Wilson government in April 1974 had been between £2 3Om to £25Om.
However, "soon after being sanctioned . . . Chevaline built up to involve a team
of about 5,000 people, spending about £2m a week. . . . A review of the project
in 1 976 established that the Ministry of Defence had previously underestimated
the complexity and cost and the 1975 figure of about £35Om to equip the four
Polaris boats was increased to £6OOm and the in-service date changed from
1 979 to 198 1 . A further review a year later led to a second revision of costs to
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£800m. Since 1977, the only significant increases in cost now put at £ 1 bn have
�

been due to inflation."

In any event, following earlier established patterns of British nuclear policy
management, it was only in January 1 980, "almost six years after it was given
the go-ahead . . . [that] the Commons [was] given the true [cost] figure of

£ 1 ,OOOm .

.

.

"206 for

the Chevaline program. And of equal significance is the

fact that only in July 1 98 1 did the powerful House of Commons "spending
watchdog," the Public Accounts Committee , finally agree to launch a special

investigation of ..the lack of fmancial control" exerted over the research and
207
development of Chevaline.
This action illustrates the fact that Chevaline's

development was so crucial to the continued credibility of Britain's deterrent
that its cost was no object to successive governments. It was only after the

research and development phase had been completed and Chevaline was almost
ready for deployment that the luxury of public discussion and parliamentary
debate could be safely indulged. Here again, the terms of debate were ques
tionable, focusing on the notion that "Chevaline was simply a job creation
scheme to keep Aldermaston going" between the Polaris phase�ut and the
208
deployment of its successor.
But Chevaline-as-job-creation flies in the face
of the entire history of the British nuclear weapons effort. The focus on
Chevaline-as-job-creation, and not deterrence itself, actually parallels the
utilization of prestige as a diversion away from an articulated strategic deter

rence doctrine. Here again, the investment of blood and treasure speaks more
eloquently than mere words.

As the successor to Polaris, the Trident submarine will constitute the third

generation British nuclear deterrent. Four new Trident IT submarines are being
built and armed with American-supplied Trident missiles, the warheads of
which will be British-made. In the fall of 1 993, the British defence ministry

revealed that 1 994 was to be the "original in-service-date" for Trident. While

original development costs

(in £million)

for the Trident missile system were

projected to be £3,447, it was revealed that the estimated final development
costs were considerably lower, at £2, 155. As for the Trident submarines, the
original development cost of the first one was estimated to be £1 ,460, while the
estimated final development cost was projected to be £1 ,395. Final develop
ment costs for the second and third Trident submarines were projected to be

£869 and £891 respectively.209

When the Trident decision was first announced in July 1 980, the prime
minister was questioned on her government 's priorities

in

view of the £5

billion price tag involved. Mrs. Thatcher's reply was instructive: .. It is the prime
duty of government to secure the defense of the realm. Freedom is worth

51

TM Newport Papers
preserving.

"210

At a later point in the discussion, Mrs. Thatcher conveyed in

very explicit tenns the operative meaning of defense of the realm:

For us to show weakness in the face of increasing Soviet expenditure would place
the future of this COWltry and our way of life in jeopardy. This Government will
never do that.21 1
These statements, however, did not put an end to the matter. The manifestly

declaratory or dissimulative nature of "prestige" as an operative concept was

revealed in the parliamentary debate on Trident held on 1 S July 1980, as Stanley

Newens, Labour Member from Harlow, put this question to the minister of

defence: "Are we not merely going in for this tremendously expensive deterrent
for reasons of prestige?..

212

Pym's treatment of the query was at once explicit

and contextually consistent with the budgetary data presented above:

There is no question of prestige or status. It has been a cold analysis of the facts
of the situation. This deterrent capability exists to preserve the peace. It exists
not to be used. It is the threat of the use that is the deterrent. It is not as expensive
as a war.213
Prestige, then, has been explicitly and officially disconfirmed as an operative

element in British nuclear deterrence doctrine. If Britain needed a motive for
developing an independent nuclear capability, then prestige could not have been

the source of that motivation. "Prestige" could not have justified the level of
investment Britain committed herself to research, design, and develop nuclear

weapons in the postwar period. Even if, for public consumption, prestige had

been made to serve in a declaratory sense, prestige doctrinally nevertheless
remained disconnected from operative doctrinal considerations. In Britain's

case, the ambiguity was contrived for important political if not strategic reasons:

The debate about nuclear weapons seems to be intrinsically about a wider issue:
Britain's role in international affairs. IT this is a reasonable picture of some of the
most important political divergences about the deterrent it might go some way
towards explaining the relative lack of authoritative exegesis over doctrine.214
A clear discussion of Britain's role, hence her geostrategic objectives, was to

be avoided, and to this extent prestige in its dissimulative role had served as a

convenient diversion, an instrument of statecraft. By leaving such a topic

ambigu ous and abstract, sensitive issues are avoided. Some questions, involv
ing the life and death of the state itself, may be situational : conditions under
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which unilateral steps might have to be taken, even against the interests of her

closest ally, the United States. Such questions are, of course, embarrasin
s g for

all concerned, are subversive of allied solidarity when raised, and for this reason
are best left unspoken, even if comprehended and appreciated by those granted
the understanding.

British officials adhere to this policy of discretion with a fidelity that
confinns its transcendent power. Lord David Owen, former Leader of the

Opposition Social Democratic Party, observed, with reference to Anglo

American relations and by implication the Anglo-American special relationship
applicable to nuclear weapons:

Mrs. TIlatcher believes as a matter of principle that she should never display any
public irritation with the course of Anglo-American relations, and who can say
she is wrong? For all the occasional problems with public opinion at home, if the
Atlantic Ocean is to be bridged and the intimacy of our relationship maintain�
it is not a bad discipline for our friendship that we should differ only in private?!
Discretion, then, in public discourse , with reference to the most sensitive
elements in Anglo-American relations has been an operational principle. "Pres

tige" has been a useful tool of policy management, substituting as a tromp l 'oeil,
an optical illusion for real substantive policy. Nevertheless , the widespread

acceptance of this facade as reality, in the face of empirically verifiable
evidence to the

contrary,

is itself testimony to a masterful display of policy

management, through dissimulation, by successive British governments. Such
a display does not, however, exhaust the policy management repertoire; it
serves rather to introduce policy management itself as a subject of inquiry.

Policy Management for an Independent
Nuclear Deterrent
In her study of Britain 's development of nuclear weapons, Margaret Gowing
wrote that Britain sought "to be a nuclear power for the sake of the influence
..216
A review of the sources
this was expected to give her in Washington.

confmns the accuracy of the observation. Note, for example, Foreign Secretary

Ernest Bevin 's comments on the policy management implications of Britain

not having her own independent nuclear capability. Meeting in a secret Mini

sterial Committee of the Cabinet, GEN 75, on 25 October 1946 (more than two
months before a formal, but similarly secret, decision to build the bomb), Bevin
declared:
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We've got to have this . . , . I don't mind for myself. but I don't want any other
Foreign Secretary of this country to be talked at or to by a Secretary of State in
the United States as I have just had [sic] in my discussions with Mr. Bymes. We
have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs. . . . We've got to have the
217
bloody Union lack flying on top of it.
In this instance. possession of nuclear weapons by one nuclear power was
structurally linked to the concomitant political influence to be secured from
another as a result. Significantly. the frame of reference was not that Britain in
this manner sought to gain influence over the Soviet Union-ind� that

objective was accepted as a given-but rather. over Washington.

This theme was repeated in the "Global Strategy Paper" of 1952. As "one of

the most significant documents in the history of postwar British defense

policy ...2 1

8

the Global Strategy Paper remained classified as late as January

1983.2 19 The Paper was formulated by the three service chiefs. at the suggestion

of Sir John Slessor. Chief of the Air Staff. Meeting at the Royal Naval College,

Greenwich. between 28 April and 2 May 1952. The "Greenwich Exercise." as
it came to be called. was "perhaps one of the most remarkable attempts of its
220
kind to rethink national strategy as far as possible from first principles . ..
After several drafts. the service chiefs. aided now by Sir Ian Jacob. former

military assistant secretary to the War Cabinet in World War n. forwarded the

Paper to Prime Minister Churchill. Summarizing the Global Strategy Paper
several months later. the service chiefs would note: '"The main conclusion was

that provided the deterrents of atomic air power and adequate forces on the
ground were prope

� built up, and maintained, the likelihood of war would be

much diminished."

1 Britain 's nuclear bombs would have top priority in this

strategy. While the service chiefs accepted the fact that the United States Air
Force would play the predominant role in deterring the Soviet Union, the Global
Strategy Paper nevertheless explicitly addressed the utilization of Britain 's
nuclear deterrent as a policy instrument. Noted Eric Grove, "The main role of
the future British nuclear bomber force was to gain influence over the direction
of an Allied strategic nuclear offensive towards targets of the greatest impor
"
tance to the United Kingdom. 222 In 1952. this reference could only be directed
towards the United States.

In his study of the Sandys White Paper, Professor Martin Navias has likewise

commented upon Britain's possesis on of an independent nuclear deterrent "as
an

incentive to the United States to include Britain in her strategic plans and

her deterrent orbit. ..223 Thus in November 1957 "a senior (though unnamed)

official in the British Ministry of Defence informed American officials at their

Embassy in London: 'UK nuclear weapons production was largely for political
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reasons, both in tenns [of a] desire to give [the] UK increased stature as a nuclear

power and in [the] hope [that] UK possession [of] these weapons would give
[her] greater leverage in dealing with [the] US., ,,224
Should there be any doubt, therefore, about the proper contextual basis for
Prime Minister Macmillan's remarks in a letter of 5 August 1 96 1 to the Queen?
"I have always thought about American Presidents that the great thing is to get
them to do what we want. Praise or blame we can leave to history."m In such
comments as these, the full meaning of the Anglo-American special relationship
emerges as a functional component of British strategic detenence doctrine. An
uncharacteristically explicit reference to the dynamics of this process was made
just as the Trident decision was announced:
One policy-maker involved in the Trident decision said: "The real point of the

British deterrent is to lock the United States into Europe. So long as we have a

weapon that is as good as the biggest bang they can make, the Americans cannot
disengage themselves

.

..226

Thus, the reality is that through her possession of an independent nuclear
deterrent, and notwithstanding extensive cooperation with the U.S. in nuclear
weapons programs, the Americans are compelled to take British interests into
consideration. To the extent that it is so, U.S. freedom of action at the strategic
level will be circumscribed. The following appreciation of the dilemma this
situation presents to American policymakers is illustrative:
Because we have assumed part of the burden which you bear in possessing these
destruction, and because we stand with you in our
detennination to deter aggression, we seek to ensure that the responsibility of
deciding when and whether this ultimate expression of force shall be used, will
also be shared. We have the right, by virtue of this burden, to be heard in your
counsels. And you should not forget that these weapons also give us a better
ability than some of your other friends to stand aside from your decision, if we
127
do not agree with your proposition.
terrible weapons of mass

Through such a scenario as this, British strategic deterrence doctrine is made
manifest. But for all its theatrical ambience, such deterrent power is no less
existentially operative and therefore exists as an elemental part of the strategic
calculus, a force to be reckoned with. This being the case, some attention should
be paid to the strategic systems found in Britain's nuclear arsenal, as they have
evolved over three developmental generations.
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The Genesis of Deterrent Systems:
The V-Bomber
The earliest delivery system was the V-Bomber. It was configured to

approximate the American B-47 medium-range bomber. According to Pierre,
it was "a most interesting historical fact that the Defence Subcommittee of the
Cabinet made the decision to manufacture the atomic bomb . . . in the same

month that the V-Bomber specifications were issued. Certainly the link between
the two actions must have been in the mind of at least one Cabinet minister."228

By the time that Britain conducted her ftrst atomic test in October 1952, the
V-Bomber was still virtually a prototype. Nevertheless ,

by 1954 the trend towards what might be termed an independent deterrent role
could be read between the lines of that year's Defence White Paper:
"From our past experience and current knowledge we have a significant con
tribution to make both to the technical and to the tactical development of strategic

air power. We intend as soon as possible to build up on the Royal Air Force a
force of modem bombers capable of using the atomic weapons to the fullest

effect."229

Although research and development bad been ongoing since at least 1952,
Britain officially declared her intentions to proceed with the manufacture of the

hydrogen bomb in the 1955 Defence White Paper. These intentions were made
manifest in the conclusion to a section on "The Tasks Before Us":
We must therefore contribute to the deterrent and to our own defense by building

up our own stock of nuclear weapons of all types and by developing the most up
to date means of delivery . . . . We must, in our allocation of resources, assign

even higher priority to the primary deterrent .110

Thus, the V-Bombers, which were ready to come on-stream, could be adapted

easily to carry hydrogen bombs as well as atomic weapons. "Indeed , it was

thought that thennonuclear bombs would require fewer bombers and neces
sitate less accurate delivery. The very availability of the H-bomb and its means
of transport argued for its acquisition. . . . More fundamentally, strategic

doctrine as it had been evolving in Britain supported the H-bomb as the apex
2
of an independent nuclear deterrent. 3 1 By 1955, therefore, the ftrst V-Bomber
"

squadron equipped to carry atomic bombs-the Valiants-became operational.

Nevertheless , by 1956, "three-quarters of Bomber Command's total strength
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still consisted of Canberras that were unable to reach the Russ ian heartland. ..

232

Britain keenl y felt this strategic vulnerability at the time of the 1 956 Suez Crisis:
In November 1956 the RAP was equipped with atomic bombs and a means of
delivery. But since they did not constitute an effective deterrent against the Soviet
Union, the possession of nuclear weapons did little to strengthen British resolve
against the threat of RWISian rockets. . . . The vulnerability of the British Isles in
a nuclear exchange and the inadequacy of the deterrent capability of British
nuclear weapons could not have been overlooked in Downing Street.233

More Valiant bombers were delivered to the RAP in 1 956; the fltSt Vulcan

squadron entered service in 1 957, the year of Britain·s fltSt successful H-bomb
234
test. Victor bombers fltSt became operational in the spring of 1 958.
By that
time, Britain's sense of strategic vulnerability, so keenly felt at Suez, had eased
considerably. Randolph Churchill, the son of Sir Winston, and an astute

political journalist, was able to inform the American Chamber of Commerce in
London that:

Britain can knock down twelve cities in the region of Stalingraad [sic] and
Moscow from bases in Britain and another dozen in the Crimea from bases in
Cyprus. We did not have that power at the time of Suez. We are a major power
235
agatn.
•

For the fltSt time, we have explicit data confirming when, where, and how
Britain·s strategic deterrent could unilaterally wrec k the Soviet Union. Britain
was no longer to play strategic hostage either to the Soviet Union or to the
blandishments of American diplomacy.
While Bomber Command had completed its deployment of V-Bomber
squadrons by 1 960, the Vulcans and Victors were not equipped with hydrogen
236
Once fully operational, however, they constituted "a

bombs until 1 96 1 .

fonnidable offensive force. Capable of flying at over 50,000 feet and of
reaching nearly Mach I, their altitude and speed performances compared
237
favorably with the best Soviet and American bomber aircraft. ..
By 1 96 1 , the

V-Bomber force had reached full strength, 1 80 aircraft which "were capable of
reaching the majority of industrial targets in Russi a from bases in Britain and

Cyprus."

In assess ing the British role in the containment of the Soviet Union, a good
deal of credit must be given to the V -Bomber force of the RAP. Its role in this

mission was neither token nor marginal:
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The V -Bomber force of Victors, Valiants, and Vulcans, because of its proximity
to the Warsaw Pact, had certain advantages over the American Strategic Air
Command and had sufficient flexibility to pick out enemy targets of compelling
local interest. It would have played a prominent part in the "flrSt wave" of a
Western nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. 238
On delivery of Mark n V-Bombers to Bomber Command in 1 963- 1 964,

Britain's strategic deterrent was further enhanced by virtue of a longer-range

capability and attainment of a higher operational ceiling. The Mark n carried
Blue Steel "stand-otr' bombs as well, which could be launched two hundred

miles away from the target, thereby rendering enemy air defenses vulnerable
to penetration. As the RAP became concerned about the vulnerability of its
strategic deterrent force after 1958, a variety of countermeasures were taken:

aircraft were dispersed, planes were scrambled in four minutes, and low-level

flying exercises were held to teach bombers the techniques of radar evasion.239

In this way, Britain sought to maintain the integrity of her deterrent's assured
destruction capability at a time of dynamic technological change. Paradoxical

ly, however, ..this was a somewhat melancholy struggle against obsoles

cence . . . for the simple reason that the V-Bomber force did not come fully of
age until the era of missi les."240 Indeed, it was not until 1 963 that the Defence

White Paper of that year declared the V -Bomber force had reached its peak. 24 1

How paradoxical then, that Britain's nuclear weapon systems entered their
second generation under the Nassau Agreement of 1 962, just as the ftrst

generation air-delivered deterrent was reaching its own height. By virtue of her
acceptance of Polaris missiles from the United States, Britain's strategic

deterrent thereby rested on two pillars: the V-Bomber and the Polaris ballistic

missile submarine.

The Second Generation
The Missiles of Polaris
The Polaris system was ideally suited to Britain's needs. In terms of cost and

technological level, Polaris was not priced prohibitively high or "prone to
obsolescence. " 242 Furthermore, the Polaris force was relatively invulnerable to
surprise attack, hence could not be a causal factor in the precipitation of a crisis.

That is to say, since Polaris was in fact invulnerable, an adversary had no

incentive to launch a preemptive strike upon a Polaris submarine force. To do

so would be suicidal for the initiator. Having evaded an enemy's ..ftrst strike,"

the Polaris force could then launch its own "second strike" in retaliation. The
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Polaris missiles were counter-city weapons only, not accurate enough for
strikes on an adversary's strategic forces. And yet the very destructive
capability inherent in them could, and did, exert a certain stability into great
power politics.
The fact that only four ballistic missile submarines eventually joined the
Royal Navy did not marginalize their impact on the strategic calculus, and, in
particular, Britain's place in that equation. To assume anything else would be
to misperceive the nature of Britain 's second generation deterrent and its overall
capability. Professor Freedman has drawn the appropriate conclusion from this
premise, to wit:
It should not therefore be thought that, because of the comparative size of the
arsenals of the superpowers, the missiles contained in even one Polaris sub
marine do not present a serious nuclear threat. They could inflict a catastrophe
143
of immense proportions on the Soviet people.

The Polaris submarine could inflict catastrophe on any people, for that
matter. By gaining a second generation nuclear deterrent of the magnitude of
Polaris, Britain's position as a nuclear power with second-strike capability was
considerably enhanced. This enhancement would need to be factored into the
global calculus of power, as much by Britain·s allies as by her adversaries.
An understanding of the Polaris project, as well as those of its successors
(the Chevaline replacement, and the next generation system, Trident), would
be incomplete without some attention to program management.
As a result of the Nassau Conference, Britain established a "Polaris Execu
tive" organization, or CPE (for Chief, Polaris Executive), to manage the project
from the British side. Unlike the divisions which had prevailed at the political
level between Britain and the United States over the British deterrent, relations
between the Royal Navy and the United States Navy were correct, professional,
and organizationally close. The U.S. Navy assigned its Special Projects Office
(SP), originally established to manage the American Polaris Program, as the
liaison with the Royal Navy for the duration of the project.
The transfer to Britain of the American experience in the Polaris program
was actually the first of the fruits from the Nassau Conference to be harvested.
The observations of Professor Nailor, a member of the Polaris Executive, are
well worth repeating:
It was inevitable that American ideas and experience should be taken as a model
against which to set British needs: The United States Navy had been operating
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FBM [i.e., Fleet Ballistic Missile] submarines in their fleet since November 1960
with great success, and it would have been ridiculous not to use this experience
and infonnation. The general pattern of operating cycles, the provision of two
crews for each boat in order to maintain a high level of operational availability,
and the insistence on high maintenance standards all derived from American
practice.2A4

One of the most significant developments to emerge from Britain's Polaris

construction program was the fact that operations stressed the raising of
perfonnance standards "and expectations of significant elements in the defense

procurement process in the United Kingdom . ..245 This development was at least
as important as the development and assimilation of nuclear shipbuilding
technology, for it laid the groundwork for all future British efforts in this area.

The British adopted "critical path network analysis" techniques to facilitate the

project management mission of the Polaris Executive team. The latter insisted
246
these techniques be applied by the prime shipbuilding contractors.
This

practice "introduced modem management science to areas both of the Civil

Service and to private industry where it had been previously unknown ...247 The

British borrowed on the American experience in defense contract management,

holding regular meetings between contractors and Polaris Executive personnel,
to monitor production milestones. Polaris thus brought essential modem
management techniques to British industry, with obvious possibilities for future
civilian application.
The Polaris Sales Agreement, signed on 6 Aprll l963, committed the U.S.
government to furnish Britain with Polaris "missiles themselves and their
support equipment and instructions on how to use them. Other than this, no
other infonnation on the design of the missiles was to be included ... 248

A special subcommittee , the "Joint Re-entry System Working Group," was

established to manage the marriage of British-manufactured warheads to the
American Polaris A-3 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile System (SLBMS).
Under the terms of the sales agreement, also, ..the Americans committed
themselves to share infonnation on any improvement in any element of the
weapon system and its platfonn except re-entry vehicles. Any improvements
suggested by the British would be made available in return . ..249

The British-designed re-entry system was proven in several experimental

tests, one of which was an underground nuclear test conducted at the U.S.

Atomic Energy Commission test site in Nevada (November 1 965 ) . The Prime

Minister announced the successful test results in the House of Commons on 1 8
250
November 1965. By the spring of 1966, all design work had been completed.
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The ftrst test-firing of . Polaris A-3 missile by the British was conducted
from the HMS Raolution, submerged off the Florida coast, at 1 1 : 15 A.M. on

15 February 1968.

In his study of British naval policy since

1945, Eric Grove

declared the test to have been ". remarkable achievement of planning and

management . . . perhaps unknown in the postwar history of the Royal

Navy . .. 251 The HMS Raolu.tion conducted her ftrst patrol in June 1968, and
252
since June 1969 at least one SSBN has been on patrol at all times.
With respect to costs, as evidenced from Statements on the Defence Fs

timates for 1965 and 1975, in 1965 the V-Bomber force absorbed up to 6 percent
of the total defense budget. By 1975, however, the cost of the Polaris force was

taking up less than 1.5 percent of the defense budget. 253 Professor Grove was
hardly exaggerating when he concluded that Polaris "was undoubtedly the most
successful British weapon procurement project of the whole postwar

period. ..254 Therefore, the Chairman of Vicker Shipbuilders cannot be faulted
for his assertion that "Polaris was the best defense bargain the British taxpayer
ever had. ..25S

The Chevaline Interregnum.
Realizing that Polaris would be approaching obsolescence by the early

1990s, Britain decided to develop and deploy a replacement for the warhead on
the Polaris A-3 missile. This replacement, Britain hoped, would prove to be an
interim solution to bridge the gap between the rapidly aging second-generation
Polaris deterrent and a third-generation deterrent on the horizon. The result was
Chevaline. This Chevaline replacement program has been overshadowed both

by Polaris and the successor Trident n systems.

Indeed,

the strategic studies

literature and American media in the 1980s generally ignored this development.
Chevaline, however, was a far more signiftcant development than was indicated

by the inattention it received at the time.
The Chevaline missile had its origins

in

1967, as an attempt by the u.S. to

counteract offensively the Soviet construction of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
system, code-named Galosh, around Moscow and its environs. The ultimate
U.S. solution to the problem posed by Galosh lay in the development of a MIRV
system, the Poseidon. The product of an advanced technology, it was believed
that Poseidon could neutralize Soviet ABM defenses by virtue of the inde
pendent targetability of each of the multiple warheads it deployed.

In

this

dynamic environment, it was readily apparent to Britain that the overriding
strategic imperative would be the retention of similar capabilities. This is to
say, Britain would need to retain for herself the capability to neutralize any
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potential threat inherent in a Soviet ABM barrier in place around Moscow. For
Britain, therefore, pursuit of her so-called Moscow Option or the " 'Moscow
Criterion,' the belief that it is absolutely vital for the Soviet capital to be
[credibly] threatened at all times,..256 would remain a strategic imperative.

Out of the vacuum created (as discussed above) by Poseidon's non
availability to Britain, Chevaline emerged as the solution to Britain's continuing
strategic requirements. When the United States decided to pursue Poseidon and

the MIRV concept, she abandoned continued research and development work
on the less technologically advanced systems to penetrate ABM barriers.

Poseidon had won the day: the United States was now totally committed to
257
nuclear delivery systems with a MIRV configuration.
This departure proved to be a window of opportunity for British scientists
and engineers. They chose to exploit fully the potential heretofore only barely
revealed in the existing intermediate technology. Britain decided to redirect her

own research and development away from work on a MIRV warhead and focus

efforts on a redesigned warhead for the Polaris missile that would assure

penetrability and greater accuracy through warhead hardening and the utiliza
258
tion of decoys.
A research program to develop miniaturized thermonuclear

warheads was already in progress at the Aldermaston nuclear weapons research

establishment. Aldermaston was already far along in this program by 1976,
when it was assigned the additional task of developing the non-nuclear penetra
259
tion aids (or decoys) .

The fmal achievement that was to be Chevaline came only after a number of
seemingly insurmountable obstacles were overcome. The Chevaline project
"turned out to be the most complex piece of weapon system engineering ever
undertaken in Britain." "Fearsomely complicated.. was the description of a
senior defense scientist involved in the project. 260

Realizing the technological complexity involved at the outset, the British
government determined that a new managerial concept would have to be
employed "to coordinate the efforts of an unusually large number of organiza
. 261
tions, some in the U.S ..
During the peak three years of development-be
tween 1 977 and 1980-it was estimated that about fifty companies, four
government defense research centers, and some five thousand individuals were
262
involved in the project.
The defence ministry chose as project chief,

Fred East, Director of the Royal Armaments Research and Development
Establishment (RARDE) at Fort Ha lstead. East approached his assign
ment with experience in almost every previous British nuclear weapons
program; he assembled a small project team around him at the defence ministry.
62

Greenberg
Aldennaston was joined by her sister research centers, the Propellants, Ex

plosives and Rocket Motor Establishment, the Royal Aircraft Establishment,
and the RARDE. All cooperated in the development of new propulsion systems

for the Chevaline spacecraft and its payload.

Of the fifty private companies involved during the three peak years of the

project, four played decisive roles; British Aerospace, for example, was highly

instrumental in conducting some fourteen test ftrings and flight trials from Cape
Canaveral, Florida, beginning in September 1 977. Hunting Engineering, a firm

credited with expertise in the aerodynamics of thermonuclear weapons, per
formed the structural design of the warhead. The complex computers and

navigation equipment for Chevaline were developed by Sperry. A u.s. com
263
All

pany, Bell Aerospace, provided technology on liquid fuel propulsion.

companies were required to report their progress to the appropriate research
center. British Aerospace reported directly to the flight trials director. The
complexity of the project itself, the coordination of diverse companies, contrac
tors, and thousands of personnel, when combined with the great secrecy
imposed throughout, give an impression strikingly reminiscent of the Manhat

tan Project.

British "Dependence " and the Special Relationship.

The degree of par

ticipation in Chevaline by American defense contractors can lend itself to an
assumption that Britain had become technologically dependent upon the United
States in nuclear weapons developmen�. "Dependence" however, may be a poor
descriptive, because regardless of what the United States chooses to transfer in
the way of nuclear weapons technology, Britain has never in any way abridged
her sovereign right to launch nuclear weapons unilaterally.

In Britain's case, therefore, national sovereignty over the exercise of her

nuclear deterrent has been and is the key variable sustaining the relationship

between Britain's nuclear intentions and capabilities on the one hand and her
reliance upon the U.S. for key elements in her nuclear program on the other.

Confusion over this relationship has all too often sustained a conventional

wisdom which contradicts the reality. The fact is that British reliance on the
United States for support of various aspects of her nuclear weapons program
has actually enhanced the independent nature of the British nuclear deterrent.

It is somewhat of a paradox that "while Britain has been obliged to look to the

United States as a source of strategic delivery vehicles, contingency planning for
their use has increasingly allowed for a greater range of independent action,

apparently in pursuit of a standing alone option. 264 Since this capability has given
..

Britain the requisite "operational independence," she is given the instrumentality
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thereby to make an "attempt to exert influence over current Alliance nuclear

policy ..265 Thus, if "dependence" upon the u.s. bas been an additional factor
.

allowing Britain greater operational independence, it is a strange and paradoxical

dependence indeed that also allows Britain to exert influence over u.s. policy. In
an analytical tour de force, Freedman and his colleagues have observed this
relationship to be a clever British stratagem, utilizing dependence as an instrumen
tality by which to secure greater interdependence with the United states:
on American nuclear hardware, it might be argued, bad eased
Britain into United States nuclear policy-making, since the way to be consulted

Dependence

was to make consultation necessary . 266

Dependence thus becomes for Britain the beginning of policy influence

rather than its object IT this is so, then dependence in this context needs to be

redefmed in tenns of the results it obtains for Britain vis-i-vis the United States
in the policy arena. These results are but a function of the operational inde

pendence of Britain's nuclear deterrent.

Nuclear capability-British nuclear capability-thus functions as the

mother of consultative necessity. In any event, in Britain's case, this depend

ence or cooperative interchange with the United States should not be interpreted
as a status

in which Britain lacks sovereignty over her nuclear deterrent British

dependency in the context of the special relationship, therefore, has a special

meaning. Dependence is not an example of a two-key system for firing. with

the United States retaining custodianship over one or both of the nuclear keys.
The reality is. rather. an explicit example of the application of sovereign.
nation-state power:

1be lack of self-sufficiency only really matters if it interferes with operational
independence. This is a matter of degree and is contingent on the timing and
extent to which the British could operate in a nuclear crisis in the face of active

American attempts to prevent this (which, some suggest, might even include an
American antisubmarine warfare [ASW] effort against the British nuclear
powered ballistic missile submarines. Although problems could arise if
American communications and navigational satellites were unavailable, it would

seem that if a British Prime Minister wanted to launch a nuclear strike, it would
be difficult for the United States to physically prevent this. 267

So much for the contention that Britain's dependence on the United States
in any way abridges Britain's sovereign right to take independent action using
strategic nuclear weapons.
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PerjormlJ1U:e Cluuvu:terlstics and StrtJUgic Assess1MlIt.

While Chevaline

was secretly developed, the performance characteristics of the weapon system

have nevertheless been discussed in the open literature. What has been revealed
is an awesome. death-dealing instrument of destruction. as the following

description makes clear:

"Chevaline" . . is reported to consist of a maneuvering spacecraft (post-boost
vehicle) OIl each missile loaded with two or three warheack and a large number
of balloon decoys. The warheads (themselves inside balloons to make them
indistinguishable from the decoys) are directed at the same target area but on a
number of widely differing trajectories. In order further to enhance penetration
all of one submarine's missiles are rued at the same target area. the payloads
being timed to appear simultaneously to present the largest number of threats OIl
enemy radar. The warhead balloons and decoy balloons were specifically
designed to exhaust the exo-atmospheric "Galosh" antiballistic missile (ABM)
system defending the Soviet capital.2M
.

The single strategic factor inherent in the Chevaline system which rendered
it so awesome was revealed to the House of Commons by the defence minister
in January 1980. Britain's Polaris force. said Mr. Pym. was now "effectively
invulnerable to preemptive attack 269 Here again. we can date with specificity
. ..

another mi lestone in the historical evolution of Britain's independent nuclear
deterrent. On the basis of these demonstrated capabilities then. we are in a
position to examine the consequences of Chevaline in tenns of the strategic
calculus.
The Chevaline project reconfmned Britain·s ingenuity at complex problem
solving, engineering, and building on the Polaris experience, her expertise in
the utilization of highly sophisticated organizational skills to manage a program

of Chevaline 's complexity. Britain·s great achievement in this effort cannot be

ignored. notwithstanding the critical assistance rendered by American com
panies during the course of the program.

One measure of that achievement is indicated by the apparent lack of

American success at fmding a solution to the continuing strategic defence
problem of "midcourse discrimination above the atmosphere." As late as 1 992.

an American interceptor rocket known as the Exoatmospheric Re-entry

Vehicle Interceptor System (ERIS) failed to destroy a mock warhead carried
by a land-based Minuteman ICBM in a Pacific test-firing. The ERIS interceptor
rocket was designed to intercept an approaching warhead and destroy it by
impact. In the 1992 test failure it was reported ..that the interception failed in
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part because a balloon decoy deployed with the mock warhead was farther from
the warhead than planned. " The purpose of the decoy "was . . . to simulate the
kinds of defensive techniques that a real [ICBM] would use to

try

to fool an

interceptor. A real missile would carry numerous decoys, as well as chaff and
270
It would appear that this technical problem has plagued
other false targets. "
American engineers for many years. A 1984 report sponsored by the Center for

International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University concluded; "No
one has yet solved the original problem which plagued the Nike Zeus project
in the 1950's-how to tell the real [warheads] from decoy and sensor noise. " 27 1
Assuming that the Soviet Union was similarly unsuccessful, Francis Pym's

remarks about the invulnerability of Britain's Polaris fleet as a result of
Chevaline has a much clearer contextual basis. It is just this context that renders

to Chevaline the extraordinarily high deterrent value which it has enjoyed. In
the fmal analysis, Britain 's achievement with the Chevaline project must be
measured against that standard.
The Royal Navy held acceptance trials for Chevaline, as scheduled in
January 1982. The SSBN, HMS Renown, successfully launched a miss ile,

ann ed with the Chevaline warhead, thirty miles off the Florida coast on 30
272
January 1982.
The Renown and her sister, HMS Revenge, underwent refit
to receive Chevaline warheads in 1 982. By 1 984, the Chevaline was deployed
273
on all four Polaris submarines.
By thus reconfirming Britain's position as a key player in the strategic
nuclear arena, Chevaline kept Britain "in the nuclear game." As David
Fishlock, was to observe, Chevaline's development "has now brought Britain
274
abreast of the latest U.S. developments in warheads for ballistic missiles. "
Only then was Britain able to harvest the fruit of her labors-access to Trident,
the third-generation nuclear deterrent. As a high-value strategic asset,
Chevaline was to be used as a bargaining counter in Britain's acquisition of
Trident missiles from the United States. Trident would greatly enhance the
number of target options available or open to British attack, including har
dened military targets, which she could acquire with an attack not possible
heretofore.

Trident IT: The Third Generation
Britain's development of Chevaline was a very great political and strategic
achievement, but success was purchased at a terribly high price. Whereas the
entire Polaris program cost £ 1 . 7 billion at 1 980 prices, the Chevaline upgrade
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would burden the government with costs of almost 60 percent of the original

Polaris budget (i.e., an additional £ 1 billion).27s

This demand for a Polaris replacement warhead came less than a decade into

the life cycle of a program that had

been

scheduled to last until the 1990s.

Britain, therefore, could not easily afford so soon afterward to

bear the cost of

a similar program for its third-generation deterrent. And yet Britain required a

new nuclear deterrent if she intended to continue as a nuclear power into the
twenty-fust century. Trident was the solution to this requirement.276

The decision to acquire a third-generation strategic system was announced

in Parliament in July 1 980. Commenting on the inherent strategic capabilities

of Trident, The New York Times military affairs correspondent observed,

"There can be no doubt that acquisition of the Trident would transform Britain's
..
nuclear stance . 277 The Trident missile-for which Britain would manufacture
the warheads-has a range in excess of four thousand nautical miles.

In March 1982 the British government announced that it had decided to forgo

purchase of the Trident I C4 missile system and purchase instead the more
advanced Trident II D5, for £7,000m.

This

action occurred just before the

outbreak of the Falklands War, at a time of planned decline for the Royal Navy.
Britain's reversal was actually precipitated by President Ronald Reagan's
announcement that the Trident D5 would be entering u.s. naval service in

December 1989. This was earlier than planned, and in any event before Britain's
own Trident I was to be deployed.278 Britain had, of course, faced similar

dilemmas before. As Prime Minister Thatcher was to explain, "If we were still

to go ahead with Trident I we risked spending huge sums on a system that would

be outdated and increasingly difficult to maintain as the Americans went over

to Trident 11. 279 The British did not wish "to be caught again with the
..

' logistical, operational and fmancial penalties' of deploying a system soon to
.. 80
be replaced in the American inventory . 2
In any event, the prime minister determined to follow a course that would

successfully bond a strategic imperative to economic realities: "The more we

considered the question the more it seemed that if we were to maintain a credible

deterrent, which I was utterly determined we should do, we must indeed have
..
the Trident II. But we must get it on the best possible tenns . 28 1 The American

tenns for the Trident II were especially favorable, more advantageous even than
for Trident I. Under the new arrangement, Britain was to be "protected . . . com

pletely from escalation of development costs. " The u.s. would "waive certain
provisions of the Buy American Act and advise British industry on how they

could compete, on equal terms with American industry, for subcontracts for
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weapon system components for the program as a whole, including the American
program. ..282

Nevertheless, this arrangement was arrived at only after bard bargaining on

both sides. The British had fought to secure a fixed percentage of subcontract
work for their companies. Final agreement was reached allowing Britain to

purchase the Trident n DS missile at the same price paid by the United States
Navy, in accordance with the tenns of the Polaris Sales Agreement. Equally

significant was the fact that ..the additional overheads and levies would be lower
than would have been the case under the 1980 agreement to purchase Trident

I. 283 Furthermore, it was agreed that Britain would not demand a separate
..

stockpile of Trident missiles, but rather would share the assembly and refur

bishment facilities at the U.S. Naval Submarine Base at King 's Bay, Georgia.2M

This arrangement would result in considerable savings for Britain just when

expenditures for the Royal Navy were coming under increasing pressure for
reduction.

But whatever the financial burdens to be borne, they were more thanjustified

by the degree of deterrence purchased. For Prime Minister Thatcher, the

credibility of the British nuclear deterrent was not a matter of ambiguity, but

of clarity. In the prime minister's lexicon, credibility was less a function of

alliance-in particular, American reliability-than it was of Britain 's capability

as a sovereign, thermonuclear-armed nation-state, to wit:

It was the Soviet perception of the strategic threat which would ultimately
detennine its credibility-and whatever doubts they might have about America's
willingness to launch strategic weapons in defense of Britain, they would never
doubt that a British Conservative Government would do so.w

According to an authoritative account, in the mid- 1980s, Britain's Polaris

force was capable of attacking every city with a population of 1 million or more
in the then Soviet Union. With the acquisition of the Trident n, that capability
would be enhanced, bringing all Soviet cities with populations over a hundred

thousand under threat of annihilation.286 Given this capability, and in light of

the political disintegration of the Soviet Union, what added value, if any, does

the Trident purchase bring to Great Britain? The imminent deployment of

Trident by the Royal Navy has stimulated a debate on this subject among the

informed public in Great Britain.287 Perhaps the clearest rejoinder to the implicit

overkill presumption surrounding Trident was offered by Lord Ian Orr-Ewing.

At the time of the Polaris Agreement in 1962- 1963, Lord Orr-Ewing was Civil

Lord of the Admiralty. In a letter to the editor of The TImes, he declared that
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any agreed upon reductions in American and fonner Soviet nuclear stockpiles,
due to the passing of the Cold War, were "completely irrelevant [to Britain·s]
need to replace Polaris by Trident." The operative doctrinal assumptions
offered were cogent:
F'ust, we have always followed a policy of minimum strategic nuclear deterrence.
This means having enough nuclear warheads capable of inflicting an absolute

not a relative-level of damage on a potential attacker sufficiently great to deter

him from nuclear aggression. 1be superpowers have not followed such a policy,
acquiring instead enonnously bloated nuclear stockpiles.
lust as we decided our minimum nuclear requirements in the past without

reference to superpower totals when they were dramatically rising , so we must

choose our minimum requirements for the future without reference to those totals
now they are due to fall.

Secondly, in determining the number of warheads needed for the next 30 years,

we must choose a system sufficiently flexible to constitute a minimum deterrent

not only at the start but also at the end of that 3O-year period. . . .
Rigidly to choose exactly the same warhead total for the next 30 years as has
sufficed as our minimum since the Chevaline upgrade is to assume that prolifera

tion dangers and ABM defenses will not increase and improve respectively during
211
the lifetime of Trident. That would be a reckless assumption.

Resonating through this analysis were the fllSt principles of British policy
articulated by Winston Churchill so many years before, a public testimony, if
one were needed, to their continuing validity. Their transcendent nature may
be discerned in the comments of the then defence minister, Tom King, as
Britain·s fllSt Trident submarine, HMS Vanguard, was unveiled to the public
in March 1992:
We will ensure that at all times there is one nuclear deterrent submarine on patrol,
unseen, undetectable and unattackable. That submarine will carry the minimum
load necessary to ensure the credibility of our deterrent against any potential

aggressor.

289

In any event, in the British view, Trident is not a redundant weapon system
which adds little if any value to the strategic power equation. Rather, Trident
is the sine qua non for Britain's continued standing as a nuclear power in the
unstable period lying just ahead. As Defence Minister King put it:
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Our independent strategic nuclear deterrent has been the ultimate �tee of
our security. In these uncertain times, Trident will assume that role.

In the [mal analysis, Trident was purchased on the equity of the independent
nuclear deterrent Britain had conceived, nurtured in development, and
deployed. The struggles of previous generations of British leaders to obtain

American strategic systems were minimal in comparison with the case of
Trident. The act of acquisition was therefore a confirmation of Britain's
continuing status as a nuclear power actor in the world and of the continuing
resilience of the special relationship prevailing in nuclear weapons between the

United States and United Kingdom governments.

But what of the future of British deterrence? What are Britain's objectives

and options in the new world order? The answers to these questions should
assist us in our efforts to understand the British approach to nuclear deterrence.
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The Past Is Prologue
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BRITAIN'S SEARCH for an independent nuclear deterrent has

been waged with a purposeful dedication. Her quest has been charac

terized by a clear commibnent to Churchill ' s first principles of national interest;
brilliant, innovative feats of engineering; and a statecraft that has proved

masterful. Britain's great success in this endeavor must be seen in the context
of American policies, which have varied in tone from cooperation to am

bivalence, and from hostility to quarantine. Britain's success in overcoming the
obstacles placed in her way is a tribute to her policy management skills. From

the British perspective, while American cooperation has been achieved,
American rejection of Britain's nuclear pretensions

a priori, the concomitant

periodic opposition to Britain's vital interests (such as at Suez), along with the

hints of strategic "decoupling" from Europe heard in these last years, have

encouraged British officials to question the reliability of the United States. From
each painful experience at American hands, whether it was the McMahon Act,

Suez, the Skybolt crisis, or the acquisition of Poseidon, Britain has drawn
painful conclusions, sometimes fairly, other times unfairly. Such conclusions
have had a perverse effect upon Anglo-American relations, for they have
legitimized the nationalist tendencies-the "stand alone" themes-in British
nuclear deterrence doctrine.

To understand why a nation seeks to become a nuclear power is to understand

the forces that drive the calculus of power in the world. Many years ago, Lester

The Newport Papers
B. Pearson, a fonner Canadian prime minister and Minister for External Affairs,
observed that there were "nuclear powers and Nuclear Powers." And, just as in

the days of Thucydides, when Melian "power" did not equate with the power
of either Athens or Sparta, Pearson pointed out the existential nature of the
disparities that exist in our own time between nuclear-anned nations:

True, we enjoy all the old-fashioned pride and privileges of sovereign inde
pendence. But it is also true that this sovereignty does not give us control over
the decisions which determine our destiny. You have to be a superpower with
the hydrogen bomb to enjoy all the attributes of sovereignty now-and, perhaps
not even then. 291
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's systematic defense of Britain's pursuit of
a hydrogen bomb, at a time when the United States already enjoyed possession,

is therefore illustrative:

It is a good thing we should have an independent contribution to the deterrent. I
am interested to see that some of the people who don't want to have it are the
most hostile to the United States and are more anxious that our policy should not
be subservient to the United States. The independent contribution . . . gives us a
better position with respect to the United States. It puts us where we ought to be,
in the position of a great Power. 292
The independent deterrent, then, was Britain's instrument to achieve the
great power position which alone would facilitate the furtherance of her most
vital interests. To secure those interests, therefore, meant having a nuclear

"voice." Macmillan's successor, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, spoke to this issue :

Britain's nuclear ann is our sole defense against blackmail by a nuclear power
and it is our passport to the highest councils of the world where matters of peace
and war are decided in the nuclear age.293
Britain's quest for an independent deterrent, then, was never a quest for
prestige or status, was never sought as an end in itself, but as a strategic
instrument to allow Britain to project a great power voice in the Council of
Nations. Britain's past success in this effort should be viewed as an accurate
prologue for the future.

Britain has been conventionally portrayed in the literature as a "Medium
Power," an appropriate label if the criterion is only quantitative: the relative
294
number of nuclear missiles and warheads in a nation's inventory.
H, how
ever, other criteria are applied-independent, sovereign command and control
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over weapon systems, the configuration of the strategic systems deployable and

their destructive capability, regardless of the warhead inventory-then the
conventional labels might not apply so easily. Samuel P. Huntington has

pondered this categorization question and provided another criterion beyond

that mentioned to take the true measure of a nation-state. Wrote Professor

Huntington, '"The ultimate test of a great power is its ability to renew its

power. ,,295 In light of the evidence that I have presented., Britain not only fits

this paradigm but is its prime exemplar.

Future Trends
The end of the Cold War and the passing of the Soviet threat., such as it

existed, has not meant a concomitant "end of history" or an end to disorder and

threat of war. Indeed, the very instability of Russia and the uncertainties there

resulting from economic chaos and the rise of nationalist xenophobia compel

Britain to retain her "Moscow option" as a strategic hedge and ultimate

deterrent. Speaking at an international conference on security, held in Munich

on 5 February 1 994, Malcolm Rifkind, the minister of defence, warned that
Russia's designs on her neighbors constituted the most immediate short-term

security threat.296

Britain's long-term objectives were revealed in a seminal address given by

Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to the Royal Institute of International Affairs
in January 1 993 . Defining the purpose of British foreign policy, Hurd noted:
British foreign policy exists to protect and promote British interests . . We are
not going to achieve a total new order, by ourselves or with others. But an effort
comparable to those of 1 8 15, 1 9 1 9 and the years after 1945 is needed if the
international community is to avert a continuing slide into disorder: And in that
effort Britain will be expected and will wish to play a worthy part.297
.

.

Presenting the contemporary international scene contextually alongside the

other major watersheds of international history since 1 8 1 5, Hurd signaled

Britain's intention to be a major player on the world stage in the coming years.

Left out of Hurd's remarks was the key element, without which Britain could

not play the role to which she aspired, a role to set aright the "new disorder":
possession of an independent nuclear deterrent.

As the old, familiar Cold War landmarks fade, new ones appear. Thus,

Germany is once again united. The ancient lands of Eastern Europe and Russia
are

feeling renewal as sovereign nation-states, anxious to rejoin the West and

the world community at large. The Arab nations and the Palestinian people
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together are seeking to fmd common ground with Israel in an effort to settle
one of the most intractable conflicts of the postwar period.

The United States too is undergoing profound change-turning inward to

face domestic problems, even as she attempts to meet her foreign obligations.

All this is taking place in a period of budgetary retrenchment and a downsizing

of the nation's armed forces. In the midst of these changes, the strategic calculus
itself may be shifting. Jacques Attali, the French economist and former presi

dent of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has pointed
out the alarming fact that

. . . the ills that beset American society are likely to grow in severity, making it
difficult for the United States to maintain its imperial posture without embracing
the path of wholesale economic restructuring . . . . The impressive projection of
massive American military force halfway across the World [in the Gulf war] blurs
rather than illuminates the larger question of America's real position as a fading
298
hegemonic power, not a revived one.

Whether or not this grim "declinist " prophecy is fulfilled will depend on the
strength of American economic, political, and military strategies needed to

defeat it. 299 In the meantime, the United States will pay close attention to
Britain's interests and, where necessary , heed her counsel.

The Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence
As we move toward a new and as yet undefmed world order, what stands

out amidst the dynamics of change is the enduring nature of the Anglo

American special relationship. The enduring quality of this relationship, despite
the transient incompatibilities of presidents and prime ministers, is a testimony

to American pragmatism and British policy management. In this effort,
Britain's prime ministers, from Attlee on, have proven themselves subtle
practitioners of the art of statecraft. They have managed to keep high secrets
even from Parliament when necessary , cajole American presidents to bend to
their wishes, and develop nuclear weapons, the independence of which they
have managed to preserve. With the solidification of the special relationship,

Churchill's great strategic objective is confirmed: the binding of the United

States to the United Kingdom in order to secure Britain's vital interests and to

manage jointly the world power balance.
Britain's independent nuclear deterrent thus becomes the essential prereq

uisite for realization of an interdependent nuclear relationship with the United

States. Hence, the special relationship, as a tie that binds, will not be broken for
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the foreseeable future, because it cannot be broken. Nor, for that matter, should
it be broken: both nations have too much to unite them, and a joint interest in
the maintenance of world peace.
In the fmal analysis, Britain's possession of nuclear weapons should be
understood in terms of Winston Churchill's observation about the dynamics
the physics and metaphysics-of strategic relationships. Speaking in a March
1955 parliamentary debate, Churchill declared:
Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much influence over [American]
policy or action, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent as we are today
upon their protection. We too must possess substantial deterrent power of our
own. . . 'JIJO Then it may be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have
reached a stage in this story where safe will be the sturdy child of terror, and
survival the twin brother of annihilation. I
.

tt,

The evolution in the strategic calculus since that time allows Britain to
assume a far more credible independent stance vis-i-vis the United States in
world affairs than heretofore possible, even as the special relationship binds
both nations ever closer together. And that, after all, has always been the
principal objective of British policy.
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Notes to Table 1 and Graph 1
The discrete nature of Britain's nuclear deterrence program has always
prevented an accurate assesm
s ent of cost allocations. In the pest. funds for
atomic and thermonuclear research, development, and deplo)'meut have been

successfully hidden under other budgetary categories. Thus, H.M. Central

Statistical Office has chosen to issue the following caveat in itsAnnual A bstract

of Statistics: "because of changes in the responsibilities of the Ministry of
Defence, expenditures in successive years are not necessarily comparable." See
Great Britain. Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 198 1 ed.

(London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1 98 1), Table 7 .2, Defence budget: Annual

expenditures [ 1 ] [2] , p. 1 90, n. 3. Accepting this statement at face value, it
nevertheless appears that the official data do reveal a consistent pattern of
growth in the strategic nuclear deterrent. Consequently, while the actual
budgetary allocations in the strategic sectors are most likely obscured for
reasons of national interest, those data that have been made available in the
public domain do reveal a consistent, if cyclical. pattern of 6!OWth in the

evolution of British strategic deterrence forces. It is the structure of that growth
factor that I have endeavored to illuminate.

apor data on GNP covering the years 1947-48 to 1 970-7 1 , see Great Britain,

Centn:J Statistical Office, National Income and Expenditure (London :

H.M.S.')" various years) . Quoted in Pierre, Nuclear Politics, Table I , p. 343.

GNP data for the years 1 97 1 -72 to 1 979-80 may be found in Great Britain,

Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1 98 1 ed., Table 14. 1 ,
Gross National Product by Category of Expenditure, p. 345.

GNP data for 1980- 8 1 is the author's own estimate.

GNP data for 1 98 1 -82 may be found in Great Britain, Central Statistical

Office, Annual A bstract of Statistics, 1988 ed. (London: H.M. Stationery
Office, 1 988), Table 14. 1 , Gross National Product by Category of Expenditure.

hoefense expenditures for

1 947-48 to 1 970-7 1 are referenced in Pierre,

Nuclear Politics, Table 1 , p. 343.

Por the years 197 1 -72 to 1 978-79, see Great Britain, Central Statistical

Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1 98 1 ed., Table 7.3, Defence budget:
functional analysis of the annual estimates. p. 190.

Por the years 1 98 1 -82, see Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Annual

A bstract of Statistics. 1 982 ed. (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1982), Table
7.3, Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 1 89.

COata on Defense spending as a percentage of GNP for the years 1 947-48 to

1 970-7 1 , may be found in Pierre, Nuclear Politics, Table 1 , p. 343.
87

The Newport Papers
The 1980-8 1 rate is an eslimate based on the author's projection of 1980-8 1 GNP.
'Data on strategic nuclear deterrent expenditures for the years 1947-48 to
1952-53 inclusive includes expenditures on atomic weapons, expenditures for

the Royal Ordnance Factories where weapons fabrications were undertaken. as

well as on other annaments relative to the atomic bomb project. Source:
Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and A.tomic Energy,

1945-1 952: VoL 2, Policy Execution (New York: Sl Martin's Press, 1974),

Appendix 1 6, Atomic Energy Annual Expenditure: Table 1 Annual Expendi
ture, January 194t;-March 1953, p. 85.
Further data by year are not available prior to 1 963-64.
1963-64 data are from Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, Appendix
3, Expenditure on Nuclear Weapons, p. 144.

Data for 1965-66 to 197 1 -72 have been aggregated as follows : V-Bomber

costs, Polaris costs and Special Materials costs. Source: U.K., Annua l Defence
Estimates; Twelfth Report from the Expenditure Committee, Session 1972-

73, Ministry of Defence. Quoted in Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons,
Appendix 3, Expenditures on Nuclear Weapons, p. 144. With reference to
"Special Materials," Freedman notes: " 'Special Materials' included materials

for nuclear warheads and bombs and for the propulsion units of all nuclear
submarines. This line item did not appear separately after 197 1 -72. This is

now incorporated into the figure for strategic nuclear forces of which it

constitutes a small proportion." Ibid.
V-Bomber Force

Polaris

Special Materials

Total

1965-66

£1 86m

1966-67

4Sm

£6Om

1967-68

39m

6Sm

40m

1 44m

1968-69

2Sm

70m

3 1m

126m

1 969-70

Sm

SSm

32m

92m

32m

24m

S6m

34m

20m

1970-7 1

*

1 97 1 -72

£42m
SSm

£2.28m

160m

S4m

*Beginning in 1970-7 1 , the V-Bombers were no longer counted as strategic

nuclear deterrent forces, but listed under another line item in the Annual Budget.

Data for 1972-73 to 1980- 8 1 are from Great Britain, Central Statistical

Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1 98 1 ed., Table 7.3, Defence budget:

functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 1 90.

Data for 198 1 -82 are from Great Britain, Central Statistical Office, Annual

Abstract of Statistics, 1 982 ed., Table 7.3, Defence budget: functional analysis

of the annual estimates, p. 1 89.
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OWbereas the rust U.K. atomic test was not carried out until October 1 952 at
Monte Bello, the heavy expenditures on atomic weaponry during the period
1947-48 to 1952-53 fell in research and development activity. Accordingly,
for those years I have listed the net total, Atomic Energy Annual Expenditures,
minus the allocations for "Weapons expenditure," which are listed above, at
n.d. Source: Gowing, Independence and Dete"ence: VoL 2, Policy Execution,
Appendix 1 6, Table I, p. 85.
In any case, bomber squadrons anned with atomic bombs were not opera
tional until late 1956. See Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapons, p. 4.
After the years 1952-53, no further data are available again until 1962-63.
Data for 1962-63 and 1963-64 as well as 1 964-65 are from Great Britain,
Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract o/Statistics, no. 102, 1965 ed. Table:
Exchequer revenue and expenditure, p. 269. A footnote indicates that "Atomic
Energy vote expenditure is divided between Defence and the civil item 'Univer
sities and Scientific Research. .. See ibid., p. 269, n. 6.
The data listed on the top line for the years 1 966 -67 to 1 98 1 -82 are from
Great Britain, Annual A bstract o/Statistics. For 1 966 -67 to 1976-77, see 1 976
ed., Table 1 80, Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates, p.
1 87. For the years 1977-78 to 198 1 -82 inclusive, see 1982 ed., Table 7.3,
Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates, p. 1 89.
Note: Table 7.3, Defence budget: functional analysis of the annual estimates
does not appear in the Annual Abstract 0/Statistics after 1982.
(
Freedman has disaggregated research and development data to isolate R &. D
devoted exclusively to the strategic nuclear deterrent. This disaggregation has
been tenned "other R &. D." Accordingly, for the years 1 966 -67 to 1979-80,
Freedman 's "Other R &. D" will be listed directly beneath those research and
development data noted above, at n.e., and for purposes of differentiation will
be placed in parentheses. Freedman 's rationale is as follows: "R &. D in the
strategic forces is covered under the heading 'other R &. D. ' This also includes
expenditure on the management of the whole R &. D effort in MOD, work
undertaken using MOD facilities and personnel for other government depart
ments, and also work on tactical nuclear weapons." Freedman, Britain and
Nuclear Weapons, Appendix 3, "Expenditures on Nuclear Weapons," p. 144.
In keeping with a consistent fonnat, the second (i.e., bottom) R &. D
expenditure on nuclear weapons for 1980-8 1 , is the author's own estimate.
Since the R &. D expenditure for nuclear weapons was 1 8 percent of the total
research and development expenditure for defense in 1978-79, and 16 percent
of that for 1 979-80, the author has projected the R &. D for nuclear weapons,
expressed in parentheses, to be approximately 17 percent of the total estimated
,
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R &: D for defense in 1980- 8 1 . or l1 .479m. No further ..Other R &: D" data are

available to date.

For the statistical correlation between the strategic nuclear deterrent and the

other variables treated here. see Table 2 and the accompanying data analysis.
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Table

2

Dissimulation as Stratecraft

Analysis of British Defense Expenditures
Utilizing Least Squares F8tim.ation
by Cochrane-Orcutt Type Procedure
Dependent Variable

=

Strategic Nuclear Deterrent
Estimated

Variable name
Defense Spending

%

Coefficient
as

of GNPc

(15 Observations)

T-Ratio

11 OF

a
73. 749

1 0.9 1 5*

0.47582E-O l

0.97509

and Developmenl

0. 1 7353

0.69707

Constant

-302.25

-9.3471

Research and
Development·

Other Research

*Statistical significance

=

10 or higher

See analysis of data in Table 2 on page 92.

For references to note c, e, and ( see Notes to Table 1 and Graph 1 on pages 87-90.
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Table 2

Data Analysis
As indicated in Table 2, multiple regression analysis with correlated distur

bances was performed using the Cochrane-Orcutt Type Procedure. The data

analysis did not reveal any linear growth in the strategic nuclear deterrent forces

of the United Kingdom. Rather, that growth has been cyclical over the period
examined. with the strategic deterrent being a principal beneficiary of the
expansion in defense spending as a percentage of GNP.

A multiple regression analysis was performed in order to determine which

variables or elements in British budgets, over time, corre1ated with the strategic

nuclear deterrent in a statistically significant way. For this purpose, therefore, the

strategic nuclear deterrent was held to be the dependent variable. The independent
variables examined in some fifteen observations were: Defence spending as a percent
age of GNP, Research and Development, "Other Research and Development"

Findings
The principal fmdings were quite revealing, for they demonstrated that

dissimulation was not applied to "prestige" alone as a justification for posses
sion of the deterrent, but to the budgetary data as well. Thus, the research and
development allocation, taken as an independent variable, was not found to

be

significantly correlated with the strategic nuclear deterrent Hence, research and
development data must

be

considered

statistically

irrelevant in terms of any

correlative relation to the growth of the strategic nuclear deterrent
Similarly, "Other Research and Development," when held to

be an

inde

pendent variable, was not significantly correlated with the strategic nuclear
deterrent Therefore, "Other R &. 0" ought to

be

considered a null variable,

statistically irrel evant British attempts to insinuate "Other R &. 0" along an
audit track for allocation to the strategic nuclear deterrent, notwithstanding the
statistical

irrelevance of such a correlation, merely confirms in a rather deftni

tive way that the process of dissimulation continues as statecraft.

It should be noted that Defence spending, taken as a percentage of GNP, was

found to be significantly correlated with the strategic nuclear deterrent. Defence
spending as a percentage of GNP appears to capture both GNP data and defence

expenditure data as components. In any event, the statistical relationship with

the strategic nuclear deterrent was found to be both significant and positive for
Defence spending as a percentage of GNP.

A more complete data analysis is available upon request from the writer.
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